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 Abstract 
     This thesis attempted to critically examine the concept of class as it has been 
developed and deployed by European Marxism. The central question that guided 
this investigation was: “what constitutes the being of a class?” In course of 
developing an answer to this ontological question, this thesis approached the 
problem of class from two different methodological perspectives. The first part of 
this thesis attempted to understand class via a brief examination of the history of 
the concept as it appears in the writing of Marxist theorists from the original 
writings of Marx and Engels to the more-politically oriented theories of Vladimir 
Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. The examination of the writing of Marx and Engels 
revealed that the concept of class is ambiguous at the origins of Marxist theory. 
The study of Luxemburg and Lenin attempted to demonstrate how early 20th 
century Marxism tried to make sense of this ambiguity by fixing the essence of 
classes to an autonomous and determinate sphere of economic reality.  
     The second part of this thesis approached the problem of the ontology of class 
through social theory. It picked up where part 1 left off, with a critique of the 
theory of economic determinism that was developed by 20th century Marxism. 
After rejecting this understanding of social reality, part 2 attempted to develop an 
alternative social theory from Marxist principles in order to find a new ontological 
foundation for classes.
 iii 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction…….…………………………………...1 
Part 1: Class through History 
2. Ambiguity at the Origins………………..…….….....8 
I. Economic Duality of Master and Slave…......….........8 
II. The Dual Proletariat................................................13 
III. The Problem of Class Consciousness…………….15 
IV. Multiplication of Classes....................….…...........18 
V. Theoretical Dissolution……………………………24 
VI. Conceptual Multiplicity……………………..….…26 
3. The Economic Plane of Consistency........................27 
I. Luxemburg and Praxis…....……..…………............28 
II. Lenin and Representation 
A. The Vanguard Party…………………………......32 
B. Revolution against Economism?...........................35 
III. Economic Reality and Class Identity…...………...39 
Part 2: Class through Society 
4. Crisis of Base and Superstructure….………………43 
I. Base and Superstructure…………………..….….…45 
II. What is Capital? 
A. The Importance of the Text……………………...48 
B. The Commodity in the Market and the Factory…49 
C. Fetishism………………….…....….………….....54 
III. Critiques and Responses 
A. Production as the Economic Real?......................56 
B. Fetish and Fantasy……………………………...58 
IV. MΔ’s Mirror and Origin: Surplus-Labor………...63 
V. A Final Critique: A Defense of History…………...67 
VI. Dissolution of Base and Superstructure………….71 
 
5. A New Topography of Social Reality..………..….73 
I. The Social/Societal Distinction………….……....…74 
II. Nature……………………………………….…….780 
III. Notes Towards a New Topography………….…...83 
IV. State, Economy, and Sociality.……........................85 
V. From Class to Mass to Multitude.…....…...….........90 
VI. A Brief Refrain…………………….……………...94 
VII. Iteration – What is Capital (Crisis)?.....................97 
VIII. The New Proletariat…………………………….104 
 iv 
 
6. Conclusion…...…….……………….........................106 
Bibliography……………………..…...…………...…116 
Reading List……………….…….……………..…....120 
Author’s Biography………………………………....145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
					
 
  
1. Introduction 			
 
     At the heart of Marxist theory is the idea that the character and development of 
every society is determined by a class-struggle. To formulate this idea simply 
would be to state that society splits into specific classes via the economic division 
of labor and that these classes correspond to specific strata and hierarchical 
positions. The ruling class of every epoch forces other classes to toil in order to 
produce wealth that is then appropriated by that ruling class. In this way, every 
society is structured around specific relations of class domination and 
exploitation. These relations are not fixed or static; they are determined by a 
struggle for power between classes as each ruling class attempts to maintain its 
position while the exploited class seeks to overthrow the societal order that 
oppresses it and establish a new one in its image. In this political theory, classes 
are the agents of political and societal transformation; they are the privileged 
subjects of history.  
     Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels formulated the basis for this theory of class-
struggle in the mid-19th century, when capitalism had only just emerged as a 
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dominant economic mode of production. Given their declaration, in The 
Communist Manifesto, that capitalism “cannot exist without constantly 
revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of 
production, and with them the whole relations of society,” one ought to assume 
that the social reality in which these thinkers produced their works differs greatly 
from our own. 1 Given these historico-social transformations, I think that the 
concept of class, which forms such a central part of Marxist theory, should be re-
examined. Moreover the re-examination of the concept of class is almost made 
into a necessity when one considers the ways in which the development of history 
has departed from the predictions of Marx and Engels. These authors asserted that 
the laws of the development of capitalism ensured the increasing polarization of 
society into two classes–bourgeoisie (capitalists) and proletariat (workers)–and 
that this self-movement of capitalism ensured the victory of the proletariat, which 
would inevitably make up a majority of the population of capitalist society. This 
prophesy clearly does not match the class schema today, given the development 
of a large “middle-class” in industrial and post-industrial economies of the global 
north.2 
     While the reassessment of the class divisions of capitalist societies today is 
already an ongoing and vigorous project within sociology at present, the goal of 
my thesis is to develop an ontological examination of the concept class within the 
                                               
1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, edit. Robert C. Tucker (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 476. 
2 For relatively recent sociological analyses of class division of modern capitalism, see Erik Olen 
Wright et. al., The Debate on Classes (London: Verso, 1989). The example of the middle class is 
taken from pages 3-8 of Wright’s introductory essay titled “A General Framework for the Analysis 
of Class Structure.” 
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Marxist tradition. The question that drives the following analyses will be “what is 
the ‘classness’ of class?”, or, “what defines a class qua class?” In other words, the 
following analyses will examine the specificity of the being of classes. In order to 
develop an answer to this question, the first part of this work will scrutinize the 
concept of class as it is presented in the early history of Marxist theory. This 
return to the origins of Marxist theory will reveal that the question of the concept 
of classes is still fairly ambiguous at the outset, despite the fact that the political 
project guided by this theory relies so heavily on the concept of the class-struggle. 
So, in this thesis, I intend to investigate the nature of class and evaluate the utility 
of this concept in the development of Marxist political theory.  
     I will approach the question of the classness of class through the following 
steps. In part 1, I will argue that the question of the being of classes was never 
properly formulated in the Marxist tradition. This argument will continue in 
chapter 2, through a rereading of selected writings of Marx and Engels and will 
develop the thesis that the term “class” designates a multiplicity of conceptual 
beings; I will ultimately argue that the term has no singular referent. In chapter 3, 
I will examine two prominent Marxist political theorists of the early 20th century–
Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin–and will examine how their political 
proposals and ideas attempt to make sense of the ambiguous concept of class by 
grounding it in an autonomous and determinate economic sphere of reality. The 
goal of these chapters is not only to lend some ontological specificity to the 
concept of class within the Marxist tradition, but also to acquaint the reader with 
some of the general developments and theoretical legacies of the way in which the 
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being of class was elucidated (or mystified) by Marxism. Additionally, this 
analysis will demonstrate the diversity of thought within early Marxism. 
     After this brief historical exploration of the concept of class, chapter 4 will 
examine the ontological ground in which the concept of class was rooted by early 
Marxism through a critique of the theory of social reality that is divided into an 
economic base and a societal superstructure. Chapter 4 is also intended to serve 
the reader as an explanation of some key features of Marx’s critique of capitalism 
in order to locate the concept of within this larger critical theoretical framework. 
These key concepts are the value-form of the commodity, the theory of 
exploitation, and the concept of commodity fetishism. By examining these 
concepts through a rereading of the first volume of Marx’s Capital, chapter 4 will 
develop a critique of economic determinism. This critique will assert that the 
economic theory of exploitation developed in Capital is logically incompatible 
with economic determinism. By focusing on the arguments of Marx’s magnum 
opus, this critique of the base/superstructure model seeks to attack this idea at its 
theoretical origins rather than by listing historical counterexamples, as Marxist 
theorists have been too quick to dismiss these empirical critiques on the grounds 
that they represent a perversion of theory. This argument attempts to confront the 
logic of economic determinism on the same discursive plane. 
     After discarding the base/superstructure as a model of understanding social 
reality, chapter 5 will attempt to develop a new social theory from key ideas of the 
Marxist tradition. This will be done in order to secure a new ontological 
foundation for classes. This chapter will begin by analyzing the various networks 
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of meaning in the German words that Marx and Engels use for “society,” “social,” 
and “societal.” After working out a new Marxist terminology for social reality, 
this analysis will look to the work of Étienne Balibar to understand class identity 
beyond exclusively economic relations. This chapter will then look at the theory 
of the multitude as it is presented by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire. 
This will culminate in the illustration of a new Marxist social theory from which I 
will attempt to make sense of classes.  
     Despite my intentions at the outset of this project, this work will not culminate 
in a complete ontological account of classes. It is intended to lay the groundwork 
for further philosophical investigation of the concept of class and seeks to push 
the horizons of possibility for Marxist thought by uprooting some dogmatically 
held positions. In returning to the writings of Marx and Engels, this work does not 
mean to treat these texts as sacred documents, but rather to reveal that the 
traditional meanings that have been derived from them do not have an exclusive 
claim to authenticity.  
     Having said this, at no point will this work assert that classes are fictional 
beings or that they should be discarded by political theory. Economic 
stratification and related hierarchies of power are real. There are owners of capital 
and owners of labor-power and the former certainly exploits the latter. What the 
following analyses seek to demonstrate, however, is that the borders of classes are 
not as clearly defined as that simple formulation would seem to imply. This 
complication of the class-composition of capitalist society is meant to be a 
cautionary tale. If classes are not as readily definable as has been thought, then it 
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becomes difficult to assert that a given political movement or body has an 
exclusive claim to being the representative of a given class. This claim to 
representation of the proletariat has been laid by a number of vile and brutal 
dictators who justified their atrocities by claiming that they functioned as a means 
to liberation. This thesis does not seek to deny the existence of classes; it 
questions the validity of representative power that has been built on some 
problematic understandings of class ontology in Marxism.  
 
 
  
 7 
 
 
 
 
  
Part 1: Class 
through History 
The Concept from Marx and Engels through Luxemburg and 
Lenin 
 8 
 
 
     Political theories in the Marxist tradition accept the validity and necessity of 
the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the capitalists. These two 
historical entities are conceived of as inherently antagonistic classes. Yet, all too 
often, these movements and systems of thought in the Marxist tradition fail to 
examine, first and foremost, what the political ontology of a “class” is. The 
primary result of this disagreement over, or lack of investigation into, this 
fundamental problem of the political being of the proletariat in various strains of 
Marxist thought has ensured that words like “class,” “proletariat,” and 
“bourgeoisie” have multiple definitions. These different conceptions of the 
“class” in various Marxist theories have produced radically different 
revolutionary political movements over the course of the past century and a half–
from the early social democratic movement in Germany, and its political 
descendants in Western Europe, to the Bolshevik Revolution and the development 
of the Soviet state throughout the 20th century. This first half of the thesis has two 
central goals. First, it will acquaint the reader with some of the various 
understandings of class in the Marxist tradition. Second, it will locate a common 
thread linking these heterogeneous notions of class; in doing so I hope to discover 
	
2. Ambiguity at the Origins 
Multiple Classes in Marx and Engels 
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a conceptual plane of consistency that could provide the groundwork for the 
development of an ontology of class–an effort that could, in turn, facilitate the 
development of class-consciousness.  
     Before diving into this historical investigation, some methodological concerns 
ought to be addressed. First, this explication of the multiplicity of concepts under 
the one label of “class” is rooted in a narrow and limited history of ideas. Its 
sources will be works of Marxist theory, and this chapter will be focused on the 
writings of Marx and Engels specifically. In chapter two, I will turn to writings of 
theorists working in the early 20th century. I will not claim that these texts 
represent the totality of Marxist thought concerning the political ontology of class. 
The few sources upon which this investigation relies have been selected in order 
to give a balanced understanding of the heterogeneity of concepts of class in the 
Western Marxist tradition. Questions about the social, economic, and political 
forces that play a determining role in the development of the various concepts of 
class–in short, questions linking the conceptual interiority to a material and/or 
social exteriority, while important, are not of chief concern here. This 
investigation will seldom stray from the intellectual terrain of theory.  
     Second, this project is not explicitly or directly genealogical. While a 
genealogy of the concept of class would be fascinating and invaluable, the goal 
here is not to understand how or why the concept of class underwent a series of 
transformations in the past century and a half. Again, I am only aiming to 
understand in what ways one concept of class differs from another within the 
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Marxist tradition, and to attempt to find some way in which the various concepts 
participate in some commonality.  
     Third, the thesis of this analysis is that the single word “class” has denoted a 
multiplicity of conceptual beings throughout the history of the Marxist tradition. 
This work is non-genealogical in order to avoid linking the one word to one line 
of historical development from which one could simply interpret “class” as a 
singular but changing unity. By this I mean that there really are multiple concepts 
of class at play within Marxism and that “class” is not simply one concept that is 
being altered throughout the history of Marxism. We have not abandoned one 
concept of class for another, but these various ideas about the political ontology of 
class exist simultaneously in Marxist thought today–though each idea is linked to 
at least one historical period in which it occupied a privileged place in Marxist 
political theory produced in Europe. Though the next few pages will 
chronologically map the theoretical points in the history of the ideas of class, 
tracing or drawing possible lines of flight or development from one point to 
another is too bold a task to accomplish in this text.  
I. Economic Duality of Master and Slave 
     A brief examination of some passages from the collaborative writing of Marx 
and Engels reveals that “class” is already a fairly ambiguous concept. In their first 
collaborative work, The Holy Family: A Critique of Critical Criticism, Marx and 
Engels briefly analyze the essence of class-struggle in capitalism in a section 
titled “Alienation and Social Classes.” In this work, attention is given to only two 
 11 
classes in capitalist society–the bourgeoisie (capital) and the proletariat (labor).3 
“The proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such they form a whole. They are 
both products of the world of private property. The whole question is what 
position each of these two elements occupies within the opposition.”4 These two 
classes, and the antagonism revolving around the relation to the mode of 
production between them, represent the totality of social reality in capitalism. 
That is to say that, in capitalism, society is divided into a binary made up of the 
owners of the means of production, which form the bourgeoisie, and that the 
laborers who produce commodities form the proletariat, which form the 
proletariat. Social reality in the age of capitalism is essentially determined by an 
antagonistic relationship between these two classes:  
[The bourgeoisie] is compelled to preserve its own existence and 
thereby the existence of the proletariat. This is the positive side of 
the antagonism… The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled 
to abolish itself and thereby its conditioning opposite–private 
property–which makes it a proletariat. This is the negative side of 
the antagonism… The possessing class and the proletarian class 
represent one and the same human self-alienation.5 
 
Classes emerge from the specific relations of ownership of the means of 
production. There is, then, an already given structural element to classes in 
capitalism. The owners of the means of production are capitalists, and those who 
do not own the means of production, but who must still utilize them in order to 
obtain the means of subsistence, are proletarians. But Marx is arguing that the 
                                               
3 The nouns “society” and “the social” are not synonymous in this work. The effort to distinguish 
these two symbols has been inspired by Michael Halewood, whose book, Rethinking the Social 
through Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Whitehead, will play an important role in a later chapter of 
this project. So as not to leave the reader in the dark, suffice it to say here that, in the most basic 
sense, “society” refers to a specific structural organization on the plane of “the social.” The social 
is a broader metaphysical  concept than society. 
4 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 133.  
5 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 133. 
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antagonism is societal and not individual: the issue is the system of economic 
relations that produces the specific class divisions that shape individuals.  
     The societal dimension of this schema is attested to by the fact that an 
historical movement is already given for this system of relations: the bourgeoisie 
will attempt to maintain the system of private property, while the proletariat will 
attempt to abolish this system. This historical struggle is not endless because the 
nature of the antagonism necessarily gives the proletariat the upper hand: “In its 
economic movement, it is true, private property presses towards its own 
dissolution, but it does this only by means of a developmental course that is 
unconscious and takes place independently of it and against its will, a course 
determined by the nature of the thing itself.”6 The economy not only determines 
the structure of the class-antagonism in society but also determines the 
development of that antagonism in a way that is supposedly beyond the will of the 
ruling class. As capitalism develops, it further develops the “proletariat as 
proletariat–this poverty conscious of its own spiritual and physical poverty, this 
dehumanization which is conscious of itself as a dehumanization and hence 
abolishes itself.”7 This economic and historical determinism would later be 
echoed in the first volume of Capital when Marx proclaims that “it is only in so 
far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the 
sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, as capital 
personified and endowed with consciousness and a will.”8 The bourgeoisie is 
therefore defined as the instrument of the expansion of capital while the 
                                               
6 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 134. 
7 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 134.  
8 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 334.  
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proletariat is defined as the human poverty produced by this expansion of wealth 
and that seeks to abolish the world of private property, the system of economic 
relations that produces both classes.  
     Perhaps the most fascinating implication of this brief explanation of capitalism 
as class-antagonism is the issue of consciousness. The bourgeoisie is the 
unconscious structural agent of capitalism; it is therefore alienated from human 
agency and consciousness. The proletariat, on the other hand, is developed as self-
conscious poverty in its alienation from the production of wealth. Yet the 
proletariat is still only an agent in so far as it recognizes its already determined 
role in material history: “It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even 
the proletariat as a whole pictures at present as its goal. It is a matter of what the 
proletariat is in actuality and what, in accordance with this being, it will 
historically be compelled to do.”9 Thus, from this early work, we can see that: 
there are two classes in capitalist society (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat); 
these classes are determined by the structure of the economic system; the goals of 
each class are determined by historical and economic necessity (the bourgeoisie to 
expand capital and the proletariat to abolish private property); and, finally, the 
unconsciousness of the bourgeoisie and the self-consciousness of the proletariat 
ensure the victory of the proletariat as a necessary outcome of the development of 
capital.   
II. The Dual Proletariat–Economic and Political Being(s) 
     A new dimension is added to this notion of class-antagonism or class-struggle 
at the tail end of Marx’s book The Poverty of Philosophy. In this early text, Marx 
                                               
9 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 134-135. 
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declares that “the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a 
struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is 
a total revolution… Do not say that social movement excludes political 
movement. There is never a political movement which is not at the same time 
social.”10 The social/political division that Marx is attacking here is the Hegelian 
political notion that society is divided into the public realm of the state and the 
private realm of civil society, which includes the economic sphere. According to 
Hegel, it is the state that determines the structure of civil society and therefore 
political movements are only secondarily social. In other words, social 
movements are not political, but have been determined by the political 
apparatus.11 Marx and Engels, however, have rooted the logic of historical 
development and of the structure of the society in the economic sphere. The class-
struggle is thus an economic struggle first and foremost, but it is necessarily also a 
political struggle:  
Economic conditions first transformed the mass of the people of 
the country into workers. The combination of capital has created 
for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is 
thus already a class against capital, but not yet for itself. In the 
struggle… this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a 
class for itself. But the struggle of class against class is a political 
struggle.12 
 
This restatement of the nature of class struggle adds a new level of complexity to 
the issue of class composition. At the economic level, there are already two 
opposed classes produced by capitalism. But the struggle between these classes is 
                                               
10 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 219.  
11 See, for example, Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Marx, 
The Marx-Engels Reader, 16-18.  
12 Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, 219. 
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supposed to take place at the political level. This means that in order for the 
proletariat to become a class against capital for itself, actually existing individuals 
must become conscious of their class position in the political sphere of society. 
Self-consciousness is no longer guaranteed to the proletariat; it must arrive at self-
consciousness not simply through the reality of economic oppression, but through 
a contested political struggle against that oppression. In some sense, Marx is 
positing two separate classes or at least two beings of class: the economic class 
that is given and already constituted by the economic system, and the political 
class that is defined by the developments of the class-struggle. In place of the 
certainty of the proletarian revolution, “the last word of social science will always 
be: ‘Combat or death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is 
inexorably put.”13 This indeterminacy of the class struggle and the importance of 
the constitution of the proletariat as a political being are themes that are further 
developed in the Communist Manifesto.  
III. The Problem of Class Consciousness 
     There is a realization of the impact history has had on the character of classes 
in the Manifesto that adds to this indeterminacy of the class-struggle. The opening 
line of this text’s first section, “Bourgeois and Proletarians,” is the famous dictum 
that “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles.”14 This definition of the class-struggle as history demands that Marx 
and Engels examine the implications of the history of class-struggle. It now needs 
to be explained how classes in the 19th-century Europe are produced and defined 
                                               
13 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 218.  
14 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 473. 
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by previous epochs. They begin by stating that the class-divisions of previous 
epochs were characterized by “a manifold gradation of social rank… the epoch of 
the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the 
class antagonisms… into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie 
and Proletariat.”15 The result of this simplification is not the immediate extinction 
of all other classes and class-interests; we do not jump from one self-contained 
society to another similarly closed system. The movement from one epoch to 
another is characterized by a societal rupture that opens a system to its exterior–
namely, the irruption of new productive forces that cannot be integrated into a 
structural order without that order and its elements changing in nature.  
     The Manifesto departs from the conception of class encountered in the earlier 
analysis of The Holy Family in that the bourgeoisie is no longer the already-
constituted and static half of the societal-antagonism that defines the capitalist 
epoch. In the Manifesto, the bourgeoisie is given a genesis story that ontologically 
connects it with previous societies and class-relations: 
We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose 
foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal 
society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of 
production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal 
society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of 
agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal 
relations of property became no longer compatible with the already 
developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They 
had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.16 
 
We see, then, that the bourgeoisie partially developed and was developed by a 
rupture in feudal society. Marx and Engels identify the material origin of this 
                                               
15 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 474. 
16 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 477-478. 
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rupture in the dual discovery of the Americas and a viable trade route to the East 
(via circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope). The European world was 
opened to a new exterior that expanded its markets and demanded more powerful 
productive relations than those that could be controlled by feudal class-
structures.17 It is at this point of societal rupture that the bourgeoisie emerged as a 
revolutionary productive force that ultimately determined the transition from one 
epoch to another.18  
     The account of the historical development of the proletariat in the Manifesto 
reveals that the rupture that makes the transition from one epoch to another 
possible is not completely abolished in the establishment of a societal system of 
productive relations. In other words, every society maintains a definitive relation 
to its past and previous form of societal organization. Just as the bourgeoisie is 
drawn from other classes in feudal society, “the proletariat is recruited from all 
classes of the population,” and the interests of those older classes are not 
immediately extinguished by the triumph of bourgeois society.19  
     For instance, at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, when the factory began 
to occupy a place of central importance in the mode of production, the individuals 
comprising the infantile proletariat directed their “attacks not against the 
bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production 
themselves,” and all of these efforts sought “to restore by force the vanished 
status of the workman of the Middle Ages.”20 Marx and Engels build on the split-
                                               
17 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 474. 
18 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 474. 
19 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 480. 
20 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 480. 
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being of classes (discovered in the Poverty of Philosophy) to assert that, though 
the bourgeois relations of production actually constitute a fully formed proletariat 
as an economic entity with the onset of the industrial revolution, this class does 
not recognize itself at the political level and instead continues to identify with 
vestigial class-interests. The political or societal unity of individual proletarians, 
which constitute the proletariat as a class located at the level of economic reality, 
is “broken up by their mutual competition,” which is driven by an identification 
with vestigial class-interests at the political level of reality. “At this stage, 
therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their 
enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial 
bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie.”21 The actions of the proletariat are not initially 
guided by its own economic class-interests, but by the interests of the classes from 
which the original proletarians were drawn–e.g., artisans, serfs, vassals, etc. “This 
organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political 
party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers 
themselves.”22 Thus, the ongoing political task of the proletariat is defined by the 
struggle to differentiate its own class interests from those of the classes from 
which it developed. The economic determinism of The Holy Family is replaced by 
the contingent project of political realization of class-interests in The Communist 
Manifesto. 
IV. Multiplication of Classes 
                                               
21 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 480.  
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     This struggle of the proletariat to constitute itself as a self-conscious political 
entity is further complicated in the Manifesto by the existence of peripheral 
classes aside from the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This recognition of multiple 
classes beyond the two that dominate the bourgeois societal-antagonism is a 
necessary result of the historicization of class-composition, since the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism did not immediately abolish every societal relation 
that was rooted in the feudal epoch. Marx and Engels principally highlight two 
classes: the “lower middle class” and the “dangerous class.” The former is made 
up of “the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, [etc., and] all of these fight against 
the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle 
class.”23 What is most interesting in the definition of this class is that it is made up 
of a diverse array of economic agents; the artisan and the peasant are not involved 
in the same economic relations. The articulation of a common class-identity that 
links these individuals cannot be immediately explained with reference to some 
unity within the mode of production. The “classness” of the petty-bourgeoisie is, 
therefore, developed from the consistency of their reactionary political interests. 
This definition breaks with all previous accounts of the ontology of class in that it 
posits that the petty-bourgeoisie must first be politically united and can only 
secondarily constitute an economic class. These vestigial class-identities of an 
earlier society cannot constitute their identity around their productive relations in 
capitalist society because these productive relations no longer occupy a position 
of central importance in the bourgeois mode of production. The only economic 
commonality linking the members of this class, then, is their anachronism as a 
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productive force. Lacking a coherent economic basis for their identity, this class 
instead unifies its members through the articulation of a shared reactionary 
political program. In this way, the petty-bourgeoisie is a constructed class identity 
that is rooted solely in the political level of reality. The petty-bourgeoisie seeks to 
trace a political line of flight that can reverse the ruptural transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. The proletariat must not only distinguish its own interests 
from those of its ancestors, but also from the interests of this reactionary anti-
capitalist class that persists alongside the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This 
means that the proletarian struggle for self-consciousness is not only disrupted by 
its own past, but also by the interests of this marginal class existing in the present.  
     The dangerous class similarly threatens the proletarian political project. This 
“passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here 
and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions 
of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary 
intrigue.”24 The dangerous class, or lumpenproletariat, is made up of the 
individuals who are intentionally kept from participating in the relations of 
production. The army of the unemployed is used by the bourgeoisie to threaten 
the members of the proletariat with economic insecurity. The example of extreme 
destitution and accompanying economic desperation that characterizes the 
condition of the lumpenproletarait justifies the idea that the proletariat’s 
opportunity to engage in wage-labor in order to secure the means of subsistence is 
its good fortune–a gift from the bourgeoisie. This gift of employment cannot be 
afforded to everyone and so only compliant and productive workers will continue 
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to be allowed to work for a capitalist.25 Unlike the lower middle class, the 
dangerous class is a direct product of the new mode of production. It is an 
underclass so heavily and hopelessly exploited that in the eyes of Marx and 
Engels it is only fit to be a reactionary tool of the bourgeoisie.  
     The proletariat must, therefore, be careful not to identify too strongly with this 
desperate class in its political activity, since this extreme poverty could potentially 
exacerbate above mentioned “competition between workers themselves.” The 
problem of the identity of the dangerous class is the opposite of the problem of 
the identity of the lower middle class: whereas the lower middle class has no 
unified economic interest but only a unified political being, the dangerous class is 
unified in its exclusion from relations of production and exchange but cannot be 
politically unified due to its extreme deprivation.  
     In the end, the proletariat needs to recognize its unified economic interests 
beyond a simple anti-capitalist political program. This means that it will have to 
become politically self-conscious of itself as an economic being distinct from 
both the reactionary mass of the lower middle class and the precariously deprived 
dangerous class. In laying out this political project, the Manifesto presents a new 
schematization of classes. The proletariat and bourgeoisie are the two dominant, 
but not the only, classes in capitalist society. Proletarian and bourgeois identities 
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are rooted in material economic relations, but their identities must be realized at 
the political level of reality; the proletariat is not automatically self-conscious. 
The realization of political self-consciousness for the proletariat is not guaranteed 
given the impossibility of self-consciousness of the dangerous class. It may also 
not entirely be rooted in material economic relations, given that the unity of the 
lower middle class is secured at the political and not the economic level of reality.  
     The Communist Manifesto complicates the ontology of classes not only by 
introducing a whole series of class-identities that escape the traditional proletariat-
capitalist dichotomy, but also by providing a sophisticated framework for the 
problem of class-consciousness of the proletariat itself. Each class, then, exists in 
social reality through multiple beings: there are either both an economic and a 
political incarnation of each, or there is at least a contested struggle to constitute a 
unified being-class in each of these spheres. This ontological division of classes 
leads Marx and Engels to apply the term “working-class” to the economic unity 
and the term “communist” to the effort at constituting a political unity for the 
proletariat.  
     Moreover, given the emergence of this crisis of class-consciousness, The 
Communist Manifesto seems to give some pride of place to “Communists” as the 
political agents–over the “working-class” with regard to the actualization of the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat:26  
Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most 
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every 
country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other 
hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat 
                                               
26 “Communists” is spelled with a capital C throughout the text when it is referencing the 
politically conscious members of the working-class. 
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the advantage of clearly understanding… the ultimate general 
results of the proletarian movement.27  
 
Communists are here defined as the class conscious segment of the working-class 
that will push forward the revolution. And yet, “Communists do not form a 
separate party opposed to other working class-parties. They have no interests 
separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.”28 In these passages, 
the problem of class-consciousness is simply glossed over or discarded outright. 
Communists are defined as the political agents of the revolution who have 
overcome the divide that separates the political and economic beings of the 
proletariat without explaining how such an epistemological disconnect can be 
overcome.  
     The political interests of the Communists would, therefore, not be opposed to 
working-class political parties because Communists understand the historical 
destiny of the proletariat. The problem that this formulation hides is the fact that 
working-class parties may be opposed to the strategy and tactics of Communists 
and this possibility (and reality) could only be made consistent with the 
formulation above if it is argued that these working-class parties would then be 
working against the interests of the proletariat. What this theory needs to explain, 
then, is the classness of class that is understood by Communists and which 
escapes other political beings that claim to represent the interests of the working-
class.  
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V. Theoretical Dissolution 
     Marx most clearly tries to tackle the problem of the classness of class in the 
posthumously published third volume of Capital. In the section of this work titled 
“Classes,” he briefly defines classes according to their relations of property 
ownership: “The owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and 
landowners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and ground-
rent, in other words, wage-labourers, capitalists, and landowners, constitute then 
three big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of 
production.”29 In this initial formulation, class identities are clearly defined by 
their economic activity, specifically the property relations that define capitalism. 
Other classes, aside from those listed–such as the lumpenproletarait and the petty-
bourgeoisie–are not denied class-status; they are considered marginal classes and 
they do not define the class composition of capitalism. Additionally, the simplistic 
articulation of the class-composition of capitalist society is no longer a dichotomy 
(bourgeoisie-proletariat), but is now framed as a triad. That is, landowners are 
now considered a distinct class that belongs to the epoch of capitalism (though, as 
we saw above, they are treated as a part of the petty-bourgeoisie in The 
Communist Manifesto).30 
     This altered and complicated schematization of classes in capitalist society 
quickly falls apart: “In England, modern society is indisputably most highly and 
classically developed in economic structure. Nevertheless, even here the 
stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate 
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strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere… however this is 
immaterial for our analysis.”31 Marx essentially observes that his schema is 
empirically wrong, and then argues that it should be maintained simply because it 
theoretically makes sense. This is an inexplicably contradictory moment in which 
the historical materialist argues that lessons of material history be sacrificed for 
the sake of his ideas.32 This disconnect between theory and history then forces 
Marx to ask: “What constitutes a [pure] class?” To which he responds:  
At a first glance–the identity of revenues and the sources of 
revenues… However, from this standpoint, physicians and 
officials, e.g., would also constitute two classes, for they belong to 
two distinct social groups, the members of each of these groups 
receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same 
would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank 
into which the division of social labour splits the labourers as well 
as capitalists and landlords–the latter, e.g., into owners of 
vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners, and 
owners of fisheries.33 
 
The expansion of the division of labor into every field of economic activity–even 
the factory, where it is later intensified under Taylorism and Fordism and welders 
are differentiated from riveters–multiplies the distinct economic identities of 
workers, capitalists, and landowners to such an extent that one cannot find classes 
defined by a homogenous unity of interests for all members. In volume three of 
Capital, the idea of class unity becomes an inescapable crisis at the level of 
empirically observable economic activity. Moreover, Marx presents the reader 
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with no way out of the problem since the manuscript breaks off at the very end of 
the passage I just cited.  
 
 
VI. Conceptual Multiplicity 
     The preceding analysis has attempted to demonstrate that the idea of class is 
never settled by Marx and Engels. From the early formulation of class-antagonism 
that defines capitalism in The Poverty of Philosophy to the attempt to understand 
the classness of class in volume three of Capital, there is no definitive ontological 
account of classes or the class composition of society. In the beginning of this 
analysis, we saw a confident if simplistic schematization of classes in capitalist 
society–a dialectical struggle for domination between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat–while at the end of this analysis, it appears that the entire idea of class-
identity was nearly beyond the realm of possibility. However, the reader should 
not conclude from this rhetorical trajectory that the concept of class must be 
abandoned by Marxism; although the exploration of texts in this work was 
broadly chronological, it is in no way teleological. All of the various concepts of 
class that have been revealed to hide under the same name in the writings of Marx 
and Engels have continued to live on in the history of political philosophy and 
sociology after Marx and Engels.34 As we shall see in the next chapter, these 
conceptual beings are given some coherence by being tied to an economic plane 
of consistency by Marxist philosophers of the early 20th century. 
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Economic Determinism in Luxemburg and Lenin 
 
     The ambiguity of the concept of class as it is developed in the writing of Marx 
and Engels haunts Marxist political theory through the 20th century. In this 
chapter, I will demonstrate how the multiple conceptual beings that are referred to 
by Marx and Engels with the word “class” were woven together by early 20th 
century theorists with a thread of consistency that attempts to make sense of the 
concept by grounding it in a theory of economic determinism. Marxist theory in 
the early 20th century will declare that although “classes” may have multiple 
beings (political, economic, cultural, etc.), their primordial forms are determined 
at the level of the mode of production. The central problem facing the 
anticapitalist struggle, then, is to bring this economic reality to the level of 
consciousness.  
     This chapter will pick up where the last left off by examining how the concept 
of class is made consistent in the writings of Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir 
Lenin. I am focusing this analysis on works written by two thinkers who critique 
the passivity of the international Social Democratic parties that were heirs to the 
political project of Marx and Engels after both died. Because both of the works 
examined below emerge from a remarkably similar political and theoretical 
							
3. The Early 20th Century and the 
Economic Plane of Consistency 
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climate in the history of Marxism, the fact that they present two vastly different 
understandings of the nature of class-struggle and revolution demonstrates the 
diversity of thought emerging from early 20th century Marxist thought. This 
diversity of conclusions, however, belies the pervasive influence of economic 
determinism that is at work in the works of both thinkers and the Social 
Democrats to whom they were responding.  
     Staying in line with the preceding analysis, this will not be a genealogical 
investigation. There is no unified ontological account of classes in the Marxist 
tradition, and it would be wrong to say that each variation represents a new step 
on the historical development of the concept of class. The same is to be said with 
this economic materialist grounding of the concept. The play of similarities and 
differences between the ideas and approaches of Luxemburg and Lenin are not 
teleological developments but a series of responses that do not supplant one 
another. 
I. Luxemburg and Praxis 
     Rosa Luxemburg wrote The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade 
Unions as a critique of the German Social Democratic Party’s treatment of the 
tactic of the mass strike as anathema. She argues that the problem with the Social 
Democrats’ conception of the mass strike is that it attempts to differentiate 
economic strikes from political strikes and presupposes that such movements are 
only useful for the proletariat if they can be controlled or directed by the party. 
Luxemburg argues that Social Democrats are right to say that the mass strike 
cannot be directed or propagated by a representative party, but this should not 
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matter because it is only through the self-movement of the mass strike that the 
proletariat can hope to achieve unity and self-consciousness.35 
     By making the mass strike a model of self-conscious revolutionary activity, 
Rosa Luxemburg attempts to overcome the problem of class-consciousness 
present in the work of Marx and Engels by filtering epistemology through praxis. 
In 1906, the mass strike was a hotly contested tactic of the proletarian struggle. It 
had been the dominant form of resistance and upheaval during the first Russian 
revolution against the Tsarist state and had thus seemed to prove itself to be an 
effective means of advancing proletarian interests. The problem for German 
Social Democrats, however, was the question of how the mass strike could be 
planned and implemented in a directly political manner. Luxemburg disagreed 
with the terms of this debate on the efficacy of the mass strike, arguing that “the 
mass strike is not artificially ‘made,’ not ‘decided’ at random, not ‘propagated,’ 
but that it is an historical phenomenon which, at a given moment, results from 
social conditions with historical inevitability.”36 She argues that there is no 
guiding political being that could determine, through contemplation, the direction 
of the mass strike beforehand and then direct its every development; the mass 
strike is a response to the determined trajectory of history.  
     What Luxemburg opposes in the Social Democrats’ debate about the efficacy 
of the mass strike is the presupposition that the intellectual labor aristocracy is 
responsible for the development of class-consciousness for the rest of the 
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proletariat. She argues that this debate is characterized by a fundamental 
misrecognition of the active process of the development of class-consciousness.  
In order to be able to overthrow it [absolutism] the proletariat 
require a high degree of political education, of class consciousness 
and organization. All these conditions cannot be fulfilled by 
pamphlets and leaflets, but only by the living political school, by 
the fight and in the fight, in the continuous course of the 
revolution.37 
 
Furthermore, she asserts in a preceding passage that “‘[r]evolution’ like ‘mass 
strike’ signifies nothing but an external form of the class struggle which can have 
sense and meaning only in connection with definite political situations.”38 
Revolution is therefore only the political realization of the antagonism immanent 
in the class-struggle, which brings about a crisis. It, like the mass strike, is already 
made necessary by a determined historical trajectory. The process of the 
realization of this trajectory, the realization of revolution, is not achieved by 
removing a portion of the working-class from the experience of class-struggle in 
order to contemplate it, but by intensifying the antagonism of the class-struggle 
through political action.  
     Her argument modifies The Communist Manifesto’s assertion that Communists 
as the class-conscious portion of the working-class will advance the interests of 
the proletariat by denying that their “advantage of clearly understanding… the 
ultimate general results of the proletarian movement” gives them any ability to 
command the revolution or develop class-consciousness outside of the activity of 
the revolution. In her view, Communists can initiate, but cannot direct, 
antagonistic confrontations through which the class-consciousness of the 
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proletariat will be developed.39 In this way, Luxemburg posits a solution to the 
absolute disintegration of all classes through the ever expanding division of labor 
by attacking the division between the workers and the labor aristocracy that is 
supposed to represent them. This is the first step toward the unification of the 
proletariat.  
     Thus far, however, we have not discovered the being of the proletariat as it is 
discussed in Luxemburg’s work. What this analysis seeks to understand is the 
classness of class that defines the proletariat and that must be raised to the level of 
consciousness in political activity. We at least find an expression of the 
ontological foundation of classes through Luxemburg’s understanding of the mass 
strike as both a political and an economic struggle. “In a word, the economic 
struggle is the transmitter from one political center to another; the political 
struggle is the periodic fertilization of the soil for the economic struggle… [they 
are] two interlacing sides of the proletarian class struggle in Russia. And, their 
unity is precisely the mass strike.”40 Luxemburg defines the mass strike as the 
performative link bridging the discontinuous planes of economic and political 
reality. The dual being of the proletariat that we saw emerge in the works of Marx 
and Engels resurfaces again in Luxemburg who provides an answer to the 
problem of class-consciousness. Though the two beings are united in the 
movement of the mass strike, it is important to note that ontological primacy is 
given to the economic activity in determining the being of the proletariat. The 
economic struggle taking place at the relations of production is the soil of the 
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proletarian struggle as a whole. There is certainly a dialectical character to the 
interplay between the economic and political struggles in which the latter rises up 
from the former in order to fertilize it, but the only permanent plane of being for 
the proletariat is economic. So Luxemburg ultimately argues that the political 
struggle of the proletariat is only a conscious expression of the antagonistic 
character of the economic relations of production. This means that the historical 
determinism that we encountered earlier is really the temporal expression of 
economic determinism; political activity and reality is only an outgrowth of the 
internal logic of the economic sphere.  
II. Lenin and Representation 
A. The Vanguard Party 
     The ontological primacy that Luxemburg gives the economic relations of 
production in determining the being of classes is brought to its most historically-
striking conclusion in Lenin’s formulation of the necessity of the vanguard party. 
In What is to be Done?, a pamphlet published in 1902, Lenin attempts to settle a 
debate within the Russian Social Democracy Party as to whether the proletariat 
will attain class-consciousness through economic struggle and the development of 
the mode of production or whether a political struggle is necessary to 
revolutionize the proletariat. Lenin argues for the latter, asserting that “the task of 
Social-Democracy, is to combat spontaneity [of the development of 
consciousness], to divert the working-class movement from this spontaneous, 
trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it 
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under the wing of revolutionary Social Democracy.”41 Lenin argues that the 
history of the development of working-class movements across Europe 
demonstrates that it progresses toward a phase of trade-unionism that is managed 
by the bourgeois state as a non-political struggle relegated to the antagonistic 
confrontation of workers and owners of capital. Quoting Karl Kautsky, Lenin 
argues that the restriction of the development of proletarian class-consciousness to 
the antagonistic confrontation between workers and owners of capital ignores the 
fact that “socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian 
class struggle from without… and not something that arose within it 
spontaneously [urwüchsig].”42 Lenin is here agreeing with Kautsky’s observation 
that socialist theory was produced by individuals who were members of the 
bourgeoisie–for instance, Karl Marx’s father was a relatively wealthy lawyer, who 
provided him with a liberal bourgeois education, and Friedrich Engels’ father was 
a capitalist, who owned textile factories that Engels’ would later run. Lenin 
asserts that it was because theorists like Marx and Engels were not immersed fully 
in the economic class-struggle that they could observe the laws of economic 
development and class-antagonism that would lead and determine the class-
struggle.43 
     This distinction between socialist ideology or consciousness and the material 
working-class struggle reintroduces the dichotomy of economic and political 
reality that framed the whole problem of class-consciousness in the writings of 
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Marx and Engels, and of Luxemburg. Lenin would agree with Luxemburg’s 
argument that the unity of the proletariat cannot be secured through economic 
activity alone, but would contend that this class-struggle must be given an 
explicitly political being. The language of this last sentence echoes the ontological 
primacy given to the economy in determining reality–namely, the need to develop 
the political being of the class struggle is built from the actually existing 
economic struggle between already-constituted classes. 
     Lenin proposes an incredibly different solution to the problem of class-
consciousness and unity than Luxemburg did. Where Luxemburg posits the mass 
strike as a praxis that would spontaneously secure the unity of the proletariat by 
politicizing the economic struggle, Lenin proposes the formation of a vanguard 
party that will educate the proletariat on the principles of the class-struggle and 
also forge class alliances that are explicitly political in that they project the class 
interests of the proletariat beyond the economic-struggle and into the entire class-
division of society.44 While Luxemburg’s formulation of the unifying praxis of 
the mass strike assures spontaneous class-alliances by which the petty-bourgeoisie 
and lumpenproletariat are swept up into the radical action of the proletariat 
proper, Lenin reverses the order of radicalization by arguing that Social 
Democrats “must ‘go among all classes of the population’ as theoreticians, as 
propagandists, as agitators, and as organisers.”45 In short, Lenin is arguing for the 
formation of a representative political body above the proletariat that fully 
understands proletarian class interests and spreads them throughout the social 
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strata to “proletarianize” the masses before praxis is initiated. Along these lines he 
writes: “In our time only a party that will organise really nation-wide exposures 
can become the vanguard of the revolutionary forces.”46 
     This formulation of the vanguard party is opposed to Luxemburg’s 
understanding of the complexity of historical reality that cannot be fully grasped 
by any representative body of the proletariat. In The Mass Strike…, the political 
unity of the proletariat is secured in the movement from the economic struggle 
(with already-constituted classes and class-relations) to the political struggle in 
which all other classes recognize their interests in the action of the proletariat. 
Luxemburg’s understanding of the development of class-consciousness is a 
constitutive one at the level of political reality.47 Contrary to this, Lenin’s theory 
places the agential power of the proletarian revolution in the hands of a 
representative body that fully understands the laws of history by asserting that 
nation-wide political organization is a pre-condition of revolution.  
B. Revolution against Economism? 
     At a first glance this may seem to imply that Lenin believes classes are not 
exclusively determined by an autonomous economic realm–i.e., that the political 
being of the class-struggle precedes its economic being. This perspective would, 
however, overlook the fact that Lenin believes in independent laws of history and 
societal development that are immanent in the economic struggle. Lenin is not 
arguing that the vanguard party needs to invent the interests of the proletariat, but 
rather that it can know the actual class interests of the proletariat as a distinct 
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economic being and can use this knowledge to alter the course of history by 
forging alliances with other classes that are exploited by the bourgeoisie but are 
also given some societal privileges (e.g., the petty-bourgeoisie).48 Furthermore, 
Lenin asserts that consciousness is built from the objective development of 
history and is therefore only an expression of material reality.49 This 
presupposition of epistemological immediacy of economic reality implies that the 
party that is conscious of proletariat interests is merely the representative of this 
actually existing revolutionary class and can act and lead in its favor without any 
doubt as to the validity of this principle of ontological and epistemological 
certainty and immediacy.  
     The key thing to remember about Russian Social Democracy, especially as its 
theory was advanced by Lenin and Trotsky, is that it did not develop in an 
advanced capitalist economy. The Russian state was still a centralized Tsarist 
structure propped up by a powerful military presence that was opposed not only to 
the proletarian revolution, but also to the bourgeois revolution which was to usher 
in the age of capitalism.50 As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue, in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics:  
[I]n the struggle against absolutism, none of the Russian Social 
Democratic analyses suggests that bourgeois tasks cease to be 
bourgeois when they are assumed by the proletariat. Class identity 
is constituted on the basis of the relations of production… Now, 
the clarity of this [Marxist materialist] history is marred by the 
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emergence of an anomaly: the bourgeois class cannot fulfil its role, 
and this has to be taken over by another character…51  
 
The success of the Tsarist state in thwarting a bourgeois revolution only pushes 
the responsibility for this first revolution to the proletariat, which must then 
incorporate a pseudo-bourgeois stage of development into its overall strategy. But 
this does not imply that the interests of the bourgeoisie are transformed into 
proletarian class interests, since these class interests are determined at the level of 
relations of production. At the political level, however, the vanguard party which 
represents the proletariat can be the concrete agent that carries out the class-tasks, 
which are bourgeois by nature of the relations of production from which would 
logically emerge. Leninism asserts the necessity for the vanguard party on the 
basis of the extremely muddled stratification of classes that Marx acknowledged 
in the third volume of Capital, as we saw in the previous chapter.52 This transition 
of agential responsibility for historically necessary class-tasks is one basis for the 
necessity of the class-alliance in Lenin. But the specificity of the link between 
each class-task and its “natural” agent as it is determined by the economic 
relations of production ensures that the vanguard party of the proletariat can 
develop class-alliances without losing sight of or betraying the interests of the 
proletariat. 
      This logic short-circuits the linear narrative of historical materialism, which 
argues that the proletarian revolution can only be possible given a specific stage 
of economic development–i.e., advanced industrial capitalism. The knowledge of 
                                               
51 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2014), 40. 
52 See above 22-23. 
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the laws of historical development that the vanguard party acquires allows it to 
determine another path toward the development of socialism in Russia that does 
not follow the model laid out by Marx and Engels. This short-circuit, however, 
does not imply that Lenin is breaking from the linear vision of history that guides 
historical materialism. On the contrary, Laclau and Mouffe assert that 
there is no specificity, either for Trotsky or for Lenin, which can 
assure the survival of a Soviet Sate unless a socialist revolution 
breaks out in Europe, unless the victorious working classes of the 
advanced industrial countries come to the aid of the Russian 
revolutionaries. Here the ‘abnormality’ of the dislocation of 
[economic] stages [of development] in Russia links up with the 
‘normal’ development of the West…53 
 
In other words, the “break” that the Russian Social Democrats make with 
economic determinism is limited exclusively to the material and historical 
conditions of Russia as they are situated within a much broader framework of an 
increasingly global capitalist system. Therefore, the validity of this Russian 
theory of proletarian revolution is still predicated upon the logical necessity of an 
orthodox revolution in the industrial West that follows the laws of historical 
development as they were laid out by Marx and Engels.  
     Lenin’s theory of revolution, then, is not a revolution against the economic 
determinism that seems to guide Marx’s Capital.54 On the contrary, the entire 
theory only makes sense within a broader theory of economic determinism. The 
Russian deviation from orthodox class-struggle through the formation of the 
vanguard party and class-alliances is justified with reference to the way in which 
                                               
53 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 44. 
54 In “The Revolution against Capital,” an article published in 1917, Antonio Gramsci argued that 
the Russian Revolution disproved economically determinist theories of Marxism that assert that 
social proletarian revolution is impossible without the development of advanced capitalism first 
(Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 39). 
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the historico-economic reality of Russia deviated from the “natural” development 
of Marx’s historical theory. The revolution and the class-identities that drive it are 
still profoundly tied up in an economic reality that ontologically precedes political 
reality and is the essential basis for the latter. 
III. Economic Reality and Class Identity 
     We have now seen that Lenin’s theory of proletarian politics posits the 
necessity of the representative power of the vanguard party in securing a unified 
political being of classes that will bring the proletariat to self-consciousness. 
Luxemburg, on the other hand, argues that the political unity of the proletariat 
could only be secured through the constitutive praxis of the “mass strike”–or 
“revolution,” more broadly–which could not be directed by any representative 
political party. These two theorists put forward very different political ideals for 
the development of class-consciousness for the proletariat. The success of the 
Russian revolution would ultimately secure a pride of place for Leninist political 
theory in the Marxist tradition, but the marginalization of Luxemburg’s concept of 
the constitutive formation of class-consciousness would not be forgotten by 
Marxism and, indeed, her theory could be placed within a less statist Marxist 
lineage that persists among radical theorists and political groups to the present 
day. 
     Despite their different conclusions as to how the consciousness of the 
proletariat must be developed, both of these thinkers begin to formulate the ideas, 
which we explored above, as a part of a critique of more passive economistic 
trends in the Social Democratic movements of Germany and Russia. Moreover, 
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both Lenin and Luxemburg end up rooting the political being of the proletariat in 
the economic sphere of reality–namely, where relations of production produce 
definite classes that determine the shape of society through the class-struggle. For 
both of them, then, the being of the proletariat as a class is a fact rooted in the 
economy of which individual proletarians must become conscious in their 
political life.  
     From what has just been said, it is clear that their critiques of economism do 
not attempt to assert that classes are not ontologically rooted in economic 
relations of production, but that the success of the proletarian revolution is not 
guaranteed by the development of the economy. Rather, as Lenin and Luxemburg 
both argue, the economic class-struggle must be given a political being or 
assigned a political character in order for the proletariat to emerge as a 
revolutionary force. But in each case the conditions of possibility for the 
development of the political character of the class-struggle are secured by 
economic developments: according to Luxemburg, it is the intolerable oppression 
of workers in specific sites of production that will move them to politicize their 
class-struggle by taking the mass strike to the streets, where it will symbolically 
politicize other similar economic relations of oppression and usher in a general 
revolution; according to Lenin, it is the fact that the bourgeoisie cannot develop 
the definite relations of production necessary to bring about a proletarian 
revolution that makes the vanguard party responsible for forming political class-
alliances that will further the class-interests of the proletariat. Moreover, the latter 
theory only makes sense within the context of an increasingly global capitalist 
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system from which principles of historical development can be extracted and 
adapted for the abnormal Russian situation. The fact that these two thinkers 
develop two radically different political programs out of such similar conditions is 
not our concern here; the point to keep in mind is that it is only by theoretically 
establishing an autonomous and determinate sphere of economic reality that these 
early 20th century thinker can make sense of the multiple concepts of class that are 
present in the works of Marx and Engels. 
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     The ontological primacy that 20th century Marxism gave to the economic 
sphere in determining the rest of social reality produces a dichotomy of social 
reality. But this division of social reality is rooted in Marx’s assertion that the 
character of society and every social development–from culture, politics, social 
organization, and dominant modes of thought–can be explained and critiqued 
through an examination of the material conditions of reality. This dictum 
establishes a division between a material economic base, the functioning of which 
determines the character of an institutional superstructure and its ideological 
superstructural effects. This division between base and superstructure gave rise to 
the idea that anyone who gave primary importance to superstructural elements in 
any analysis was making the claim that ideas shape the world and not the inverse. 
This is to say that analyses that attempt to explain a societal institution (such as 
the prison system) or a mode of consciousness (such as the concept of criminality) 
without reference to the economic mode of production in which they were 
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situated were dismissed for failing to recognize that societal structures are 
determined by the economy.55 Thus the distinction between base and 
superstructure functioned practically as a rubric for recognizing theorists who 
were enemies of the proletarian revolution.  When theorists steeped in the Marxist 
tradition began to depart from or challenge the importance of the economic/social 
dichotomy, their work amounted to a betrayal in the eyes of the proponents of 
traditional Marxist thought.56  
     This departure from the dichotomy, however, may not amount to a betrayal of 
the ideas laid out by Marx himself. A close reading some of Marx’s works that 
flesh out his critical materialist methodology–the German Ideology, the 
Grundrisse, the Theses on Feuerbach, the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, or the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right (to name only a few)–uncovers a different set of meanings in the phrase 
“material conditions of reality” beyond exclusively economic relations. One could 
return to Marx through any of these texts, but for the purposes of this analysis, I 
will begin this Marxist “revolution” by returning to the work that is supposed to 
justify the more positivist Marxist theories of economic essentialism–namely, 
Capital. 
     Before returning to the writing of Marx, however, the topographical model for 
understanding social reality that was hinted at by the political theories of 
                                               
55 The parenthetical examples are references to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison. 
56 Foucault was a student of Althusser and the influence Marxism had on him is apparent in 
sections of Power/Knowledge, comprised of selected interviews and writings from Foucault. See, 
in particular, Michel Foucault, “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” in 
Power/Knowledge, edit. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and 
Kate Soper (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 1-36. 
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Luxemburg and Lenin must be clarified in order to ensure that the following 
critique recognizes its target and does not develop into a strawman argument. To 
accomplish this, this chapter will begin by analyzing Louis Althusser’s “Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)”–an essay 
published in 1970 in a collection titled Lenin and Philosophy. This work presents 
one of the clearest and most succinct elaborations on and illustrations of the 
base/superstructure model. It will, therefore, serve as an excellent referent for the 
argument of this chapter. Furthermore, its date of publication will serve as an 
indication of the lasting legacy of the modes of thought presented in the first part 
of this work. The analysis of Althusser’s work will thus serve to further the 
argument of the preceding chapter–namely, that the theoretical development of 
the economic sphere as an ontological plane of consistency for the concept of 
classes holds true for modern Marxism.  
I. Base and Superstructure 
     Althusser contends that the base/superstructure model is first put forward by 
Marx as a model that represents the “social whole.”57 He is right to assert that the 
division of social reality into a base and superstructure originates in Marx: in a 
footnote to the first chapter of Capital, Marx writes that his 
view is that each particular mode of production, and the relations 
of production corresponding to it at each given moment, in short 
the ‘economic structure of society’, is ‘the real foundation on 
which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness’ and that the 
                                               
57 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation),” in Mapping Ideology, edit. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2012), 104. 
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‘mode of production of material life conditions the general process 
of social, political, and intellectual life.’58 
 
Marx is arguing that institutions that are not immediately economic in their nature 
are determined in their character by the mode of production. Furthermore, beyond 
this institutional level, the superstructure is also made up of “definite modes of 
social consciousness,” which will also be referred to in this work as 
“superstructural effects.” There are, then, three layers or “floors” to social reality, 
two of which are determined by the economic base: first there is the mode of 
production itself which then determines the politico-legal level as well as the 
ideological level.59  
     Asserting that the economic base determines all other layers of society is not to 
say that superstructural institutions and effects do not play any role in determining 
of social reality–the effects of the Tsarist state in early 20th century Russian 
society, as they were analyzed by Lenin, would serve as an obvious counter 
example to this. Rather, as Althusser argues, “It is possible to say that the floors 
of the superstructure are not determinant in the last instance, but that they are 
determined by the effectivity of the base; that if they are determinant in their own 
(as yet undefined) ways, this is true only in so far as they are determined by the 
base.”60 This more nuanced interpretation of the determinant character of the 
superstructure fits well with the discussion of the logic of the necessity of the 
                                               
58 Karl Marx, Capital Volume I (London: Penguin, 1990), trans. Ben Fowkes, 175n. This quote is 
actually an amalgamation of two passages from the Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. The idea is not introduced to socialist political theory in a footnote. I have chosen to cite 
the footnote in Capital in order to demonstrate that the validity of this social model is maintained 
by Marx throughout his writing and that it exerts a definite influence on the analyses of Captial. 
59 Althusser rephrases this subdivision of “floors” of the superstructure as a division between the 
“politico-legal” level of law and the state and the level of “ideology.” Althusser, “Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” 105. 
60 Althusser, “Ideological State Apparatuses,” 105. 
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vanguard party discussed in the previous chapter. As we saw in the preceding 
chapter, the capacity of the Russian proletariat to carry out a revolution without 
the anterior development of bourgeois relations of production can only be 
possible given the context of Russia’s location within a larger, increasingly 
global, capitalist system–in other words, bourgeois relations of production and 
circulation in other countries were naturally beginning to spread to Russia through 
global networks of circulation and production.  
     From Althusser’s brief illustration of this social theory of the determinant 
economic base and the determined societal superstructure I can draw a few key 
points that will be helpful in setting up the rest of this chapter. First, the whole of 
the economic mode of production determines or produces the specific character of 
the societal superstructure. Second, Althusser asserts that the base/superstructure 
model is a theory of the whole of social reality; therefore, to understand any 
development of society it is necessary to first understand how it originates from 
economic relations. Third, the superstructure splits into two levels: an institutional 
state-centric level and an ethereal and decentered level of ideology, or, to borrow 
Marx’s phrase, “definite modes of social consciousness.” These floors of the 
superstructure can be determinant of social relations, but only in so far as the 
superstructural levels themselves have already been determined by the economic 
base. Fourth and finally, the economic sphere, I would conclude, is privileged 
with a high level of autonomy and that all beings produced in other spheres of 
society are rooted in that autonomous and already determined economic sphere. 
The autonomy of the economic sphere with regard to the superstructures is the 
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only way to explain why it is given such a determinate role in societal formation. 
If the superstructure could effect profound changes of the economic base that did 
not develop from the determinations of the base itself, then it would be impossible 
to say that the economy is determinate of the social whole. With this argument in 
mind, let us now turn to Capital and compare the economic theory contained 
within that text with the topographical model that was just laid out. This will 
allow me to evaluate the logical compatibility of the principle of economic 
autonomy against Marx’s own theory of exploitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
II. What is Capital? 
A. The Importance of the Text 
     Capital has been seen by many as the most thorough and rigorous of Marx’s 
critical analyses of capitalism. For this reason it has been considered something 
like the authoritative and foundational text in the Marxist theory.61 The fact that 
this methodical and comprehensive work was branded by its author as a scientific 
treatise on capitalist economics inspired the positivistic developments of early 
Marxism, which reified the base/superstructure dichotomy, seeing this as a 
cornerstone of truth around which a rigorous scientific method of economic and 
social critique could be built. And if we, who would place ourselves within the 
                                               
61 For example, in his preface to the second edition of The Marx-Engels Reader, Robert C Tucker 
argues that “Marx without Capital is Kant without The Critique of Pure Reason or Darwin without 
The Origin of Species… Capital turns out to be not simply Marx’s major treatise on political 
economy, but his principle work on man, society, and government–indeed the fullest expression of 
his entire worldview” (Robert C Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, x). 
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Marxist tradition, accept the insights of Marx himself as a valid starting point for 
examining reality, then the position held by the positivists seems difficult to 
depart from given the footnote to the first chapter of Capital cited above.62 
Thankfully, for those who remain skeptical of economic determinism, an 
argument against the positivistic interpretation of the base/superstructure 
distinction (outlined above) can be drawn from Capital itself. To do this I will 
have to examine the claims being made about the functioning of two particular 
processes within the economic base: exchange and production. The development 
of this examination will summarize Marx’s analysis of the economic operations of 
capitalism, thereby acquainting the reader with key concepts of Marxist theory 
(such as exploitation, fetishism, and value), and it will also situate the concept of 
class within the broader framework of this critical theory.  
B. The Commodity in the Market and the Factory 
     Though Marx is exceptionally critical of capitalism in Capital, the first guiding 
question in the text is not “what is wrong with capitalism?”, but “what is 
capital?”; his critique of political economy begins with an analysis of the nature 
of political economy. In order to explore the question of the nature of capital, 
Marx begins Capital with an analysis of the commodity, since “the wealth of 
societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 
‘immense collection of commodities.’”63 The opening section of the text quickly 
                                               
62 The distinction between economic base and societal superstructure is definitely formulated by 
Marx. However, this does not necessarily mean that the logical structure of the distinction follows 
the reasoning of Althusser’s analysis. We can only say that the formulation of this metaphor for 
social reality by Marx is used to justify economic determinism developed by later Marxist 
theorists.  
63 Marx, Capital, 125. 
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dives into an analysis of the commodity’s two economic essences: use-value and 
exchange-value. The former belongs to the actual physical body of the 
commodity: the commodity is useful for others because of its physical traits. The 
exchange-value is the measurement by which “use-values of one kind exchange 
for use-values of another kind.”64 Both of these essences are similar in that they 
are representations of abstract material relations. Use-values are only ever made 
real through the process of the consumption of the commodity: a saw resting on 
the wall has no real use-value until the lumber worker makes use of it to fell a 
tree. Use-value, then, is actualized in the relation between commodities and 
people: this particular relation is one of consumption by which a product of labor 
is taken out of circulation in order to produce value for the consumer. 
Additionally, with the use of the term “value,” Marx is referring to an exclusively 
economic sense of activity. There may be other “values,” more broadly conceived 
– e.g., in the saw when it is resting on the wall – but these are not values that 
make the saw a commodity per se. 
     Though the example of a saw and a lumber worker may strike the reader as 
more of a process of production than one of consumption, the two are in fact 
closely related and oftentimes two sides of the same material process.65 “Labor 
                                               
64 Marx, Capital, 126. 
65 My terminology may be a bit confusing for those who have studied Marxist theory. By 
“economic activity” and “economic process,” I am referring to relations that are immediately 
economic (e.g., production, exchange, etc.). When I deploy the terms “material activity” and 
“material process,” I am referring simply to the material relations involved in an action before it 
has been given and economic dimension (perhaps because there are material actions that overspill 
what we would code as “economic activity”). This distinction is brought to bear on the proceeding 
example in the following way: the material activity is action of a person felling a tree with a saw. 
Overcoded onto this material activity (or perhaps contained within it) are two differentiated and 
simultaneous economic processes: 1) the consumption of the use-value of the saw, and 2) the 
production of the timber commodity. 
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uses up its material elements… It consumes them and therefore is a process of 
consumption.”66 The commodity as use-value enters the scene of production as 
the means of production that laborers utilize in order to produce wealth. My 
example of the saw-worker-tree relation not only clarifies the relational nature of 
use-values, but also introduces us to the differentiated processes located at the 
economic base–in this case, production and consumption–and shows us that these 
processes often occur simultaneously in the same material activity. Looked at one 
way, the utilization of the saw to cut down a tree is a non-exhaustive consumption 
of the saw’s use-value. Looked at from another angle, the process of cutting the 
tree is one of harvesting timber as a commodity; it is, therefore, also the 
production of an exchange-value.  
     Exchange-value’s realization is located in a different series of relations and is 
wrapped up in different economic processes. Because exchange-value is a 
measurement of what quantity of one commodity can be exchanged for a quantity 
of another commodity, this value materializes in the process of circulation in the 
market as a relation between different commodities. The circulation of 
commodities in economies built around the consumption of use-values follows a 
pattern in which a commodity is exchanged for money that is then exchanged for 
another commodity (C-M-C’, where C represents a commodity, C’ represents a 
                                               
66 Marx, Capital, 290. All production is consumption, but not all consumption is productive in the 
economic sense. Marx stresses that there is an objective and qualitative difference between 
consumption in labor and individual consumption of a commodity in that the former produces 
another commodity while the later produces the consumer himself. This distinction, however, 
seems to be rather arbitrary when we consider the fact that the proletarian sells labor-power as a 
commodity to the capitalist. Therefore, individual consumption also (re)produces the commodity 
of labor-power. In both cases, a commodity is produced through consumption. Individual 
consumption for the sake of subsistence and the reproduction of the life of the individual worker, 
therefore, must be recognized as a productive act.  
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qualitatively different commodity, and M represents money). The exchange-value 
is present in this mode of exchange only as a means of trading one use-value for 
another. Circulation is intended to maximize the satisfaction of needs of 
consumers; it ends when commodities are consumed and the needs of the 
consumers are satisfied.  
     The mode of circulation in capitalism follows a different pattern–namely, one 
in which money is exchanged for a commodity that is then exchanged for more 
money (M-C-M’, where M’ represents a transformed exchange-value). (If it is an 
efficient exchange, then M’ will represent a greater exchange-value than M).67 In 
this model of circulation, the attainment of money as the signifier of exchange-
value is the chief concern of economic agents, which is why Marx refers to 
exchange-value simply as value, as will be done in this work from now on. In 
capitalism, the circulation of commodities is not done for consumption and the 
satisfaction of needs, but in order to generate more wealth. Individual 
commodities may go through a number of exchanges before being consumed and 
exiting the sphere of circulation. This means that, in capitalist economies, 
commodities fulfil their purpose when they are sold on the market and not when 
they are consumed and thus leave the economic sphere. In capitalism, therefore, 
the mode of circulation begins to play a more important economic role than it did 
in economies organized around the consumption and exchange of the use-values 
of commodities. 
     Circulation and exchange are mediated by money, which functions as the 
representative of value. Whatever the material substance of the money-
                                               
67 Marx, Capital, 247-251. More will be said about the model M-C-M’ in section IV.  
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commodity may be–gold, silver, paper, digitized data–its use-value is derived 
from its designation as the universal measurement of equivalence among all other 
commodities. In this sense, it is a symbol. But this is not wholly unique to money, 
because “every commodity is a symbol, since, as value, it is only the material 
shell of human labor expended on it.”68 This is because the value of a commodity 
is derived from the cost of the raw materials and the use-value of the labor that 
produced it. Thus, what is made equivalent in exchange value is general human 
labor in the abstract: if the raw materials and (simple) labor-time for a couch and 
an ax cost the same amount, then they would have the same value. Thus, what 
money really symbolizes is the equivalence of abstract labor time invested in each 
commodity. Therefore, as the mediator of the exchange of commodities, money is 
the value-form of commodities–a symbol of value alone and therefore a symbol of 
abstract human labor.  
     Marx emphasizes the fact that value is a measure of abstract human labor 
because in order for two qualitatively different commodities to be exchanged, the 
qualitative differences of the labor that produced them must be negated or 
ignored. For an ax to be equivalent in value to a vase, not only must the cost of 
the labor and raw materials be equal, but the differences between glassblowing 
and ax making must also be considered inconsequential to the value of the 
objects. Value is a measurement of a quantity of labor-time abstracted from the 
particularities of each type of labor. Labor-power, from which value is derived, is 
then the average productivity of an unskilled individual producer. But, to find the 
average productivity of a worker, one must first find the productivity of a mass of 
                                               
68 Marx, Capital, 185.  
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workers and then evenly divide this for each of the individuals in the mass. Value 
is, therefore, a measurement of abstract individual labor-power only after it is a 
measure of abstract social labor.  
C. Fetishism 
     We have now discovered that our earlier claim–namely, that value is realized 
in circulation as a direct relation equating different commodities to one another in 
order to facilitate their exchange–is false. Arguing against this understanding of 
exchange-value, Marx asserts that “the commodity-form, and the value-relation of 
the products of labor within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with 
the physical nature of the commodity... It is nothing but the definite social relation 
between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things.”69 What the earlier formulation of the value of 
commodities hides is the fact that value is the product of social processes, i.e., the 
work of human beings, and is not something that emerges naturally from things 
exchanged. This displacement of the source of value in things and not in the 
producers of things is what Marx calls commodity fetishism and its result is the 
mediation of circulation and exchange through the use of money as the universal 
equivalent of the value of commodities. The simplest expression of the economic 
effect of fetishism is the alienation of use-value for exchange-value and the 
alienation of the source of value–i.e., labor.  
     Money’s mediation of exchange hides the double abstraction of value from the 
consciousness of economic agents. This double abstraction is: 1) the commodity’s 
symbolization of the cost of the labor-time involved in its production, and 2) 
                                               
69 Marx, Capital, 165. 
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money’s symbolization of that cost as a measurement of the value of the 
commodity. The result is that the idea of value is separated from the material 
body of the valuable thing and this valuable thing is abstracted from the social 
process of its production from which the specificity of its actual value originates. 
This issue is succinctly summarized by Slavoj Žižek when he states that “during 
the act of exchange, individuals proceed as if the commodity is not submitted to 
physical material changes; as if it is excluded from the natural cycle of generation 
and corruption…”70 Because the abstraction of value is a presupposition of 
exchange in capitalism, fetishism does not simply facilitate exchange; indeed, by 
separating value from both the physical body of the commodity and the social 
process that produced it, fetishism makes exchange possible. 
     Borrowing from Marx’s language that established the groundwork for the 
base/superstructure dichotomy, fetishism is clearly a “definite form of social 
consciousness.” According to the original formula that Marx gave us for the 
base/superstructure dichotomy, definite forms of social consciousness correspond 
to the legal and political superstructure of society, which arises from the 
economic foundation. Because of the determining influence of fetishism at this 
point of the economic base, economic determinism is now confronted with a 
seemingly insurmountable challenge: how can a superstructural effect like 
fetishism play such a central role in the operations of the economic base when the 
economic base is supposed to determine the social institutions and practices that 
produce fetishism in the first place? The inconsistency of this social model with 
                                               
70 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2008), 12. 
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Marx’s own theory of capitalism erodes the ontological ground on which classes 
were situated in the preceding chapter.  
     To escape this contradiction and to rescue an ontological foundation for 
classes, we must either argue that fetishism is not so causally important in 
capitalist economics, or we must rethink the concept of a base/superstructure 
dichotomy. Though I have no interest in defending the economic determinist 
mode of thinking, I will have to examine the objections that proponents of this 
view would raise with respect to what has been argued to this point. Doing so will 
simultaneously allow me to explore the character of fetishism further. 
III. Critiques and Responses 
A. Failure to Grasp Production as the Economic Real? 
     The first possible objection that could be raised against the reducto ad 
absurdum that this paper has built–i.e., that orthodox economic determinism is 
incompatible with Marx’s own economic theory–is that too much importance has 
been given to the money fetishism that manifests at the level of exchange, but is 
actually produced at a deeper level–namely, in the sphere of economic 
production. In other words, the orthodox Marxist would claim that this analysis 
has only dealt with the surface of capitalism, the market, and has divorced it from 
the real matter of the capitalist system, the factory. In some sense this critique of 
the preceding argument would be a reductionist position since it would limit the 
economic base solely to the realm of production. This would mean that in the 
Marxist topography of social reality, the market would have to be considered 
alongside legal and political institutions as another aspect of the superstructure, 
albeit one more closely related to the determining sphere of material reality.  
 57 
     This position must be rejected because production clearly presupposes a 
market in which goods can be exchanged, so that compensation can be secured for 
workers and profits generated for capitalists. Were there no market until 
production determined its character, then there would be no way to purchase the 
means of production needed to produce goods that could be used by commodity 
owners to establish the first markets. Marx himself states that products of labor 
“are not as yet commodities, but become so only through the act of exchange.”71 
Production in capitalism is done to produce commodities as exchange values, so 
to relegate the market to the superstructure would be senseless and only imply a 
greater causal role for superstructural forces in the operation of the economic 
base.  
     This problem brings us back to the simultaneity of differentiated economic 
processes in the same material activity (e.g., my earlier analysis of the lumber 
worker-saw-tree relation, which is both the consumption of the use-value of the 
ax by the worker and the production of lumber that will enter the market as a 
value). In this case, however, there is the presupposition of different and 
simultaneous material activities (which may be made up of simultaneous 
economic processes) in order for one economic process to make sense. The 
market is a fundamental sphere of capitalist economics and not outside of it. If we 
were to arbitrarily locate the market in the superstructure, this would not save the 
base/superstructure dichotomy, but only further problematize it given the fact that 
the market would nonetheless be so intertwined with the realm of production. The 
simultaneity of economic processes is what makes an autonomous economic 
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sphere thinkable in the first place. The superstructure would be entering the 
economic base in a more pervasive way if we limited the economic base to the 
sphere of production alone. 
B. Fetish and Fantasy 
     A second objection to the importance of fetishism in the economic base would 
be to assert that fetishism is not necessary for capitalism to function, though it 
does allow it to function more effectively. This argument would assert that the 
superstructural effects of fetishism have an economic purpose, but that its 
economic effects would not be a driving force in capitalism. In this line of 
reasoning, the money fetish would be like pavement on the road to market: 
economic actors can bring commodities to the market (which already presupposes 
the process of production, since these actors would be traveling to the market 
from the factory–i.e., the site of production) and engage in exchange there without 
the pavement, but this pavement smooths out any roughness in the “path to the 
market”–from the sphere of production–and it exists for this reason alone. The 
problem with this objection is that money fetishism is not simply a pavement that 
smooths out a pocked road to the market: it is 1) the ground on which the 
capitalist market and its model of circulation–M-C-M’–stands, and, 2) also the 
very road from the factory to the market and vice versa. Let us look at these two 
characteristics of fetishism in turn.  
     With respect to the first point, fetishism allows us to accept money as the 
representative of value without looking back on the series of abstractions that 
produced it. In that chain of abstraction, money is a symbol of the qualitatively 
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equivalent value in commodities, and the value of a commodity is itself a symbol 
of the labor expended in its production. But the labor symbolized in the 
commodity is not the specific labor belonging to particular laborers; it is abstract 
individual labor-power, which is only quantitatively arrived at after calculating 
some general value for untrained social productive labor as a whole. It is only 
because money fetishism allows us to ignore this chain of abstractions by which 
value is inextricably linked to the material social reality of production that 
individual economic agents can act as though money is the universal and 
immaterial body of value. Commodity/money fetishism, which is built into the 
very form of the commodity, is what allows us to participate in an economy built 
around the production and exchange of commodities (so that the capitalist may 
accumulate more money) without reflecting on the material roots of value, which 
would necessitate the realization that money and, by extension, the commodity 
have no value in themselves.72 If daily economic activity reflected this 
knowledge, then the circularity inherent in the capitalist system would become 
apparent. Buying commodities with money in order to sell those commodities for 
more money–M-C-M’, the capitalist model of circulation–would be exposed as a 
                                               
72 Marx, Capital, 164: “Whence, then, arises the enigmatical character of the product of labour, as 
soon as it assumes the form of commodities? Clearly from this form itself.” 
     This fact–that value is derived from the fetishistic commodity-form itself, and not the material 
content of money or of the commodity–is a traumatic kernel that must be repressed if the capitalist 
symbolic order is to properly function. This use of the term traumatic kernel is borrowed from 
Žižek, who wrote: “there is always a hard kernel, a leftover which persists and cannot be reduced 
to a universal play of illusory mirroring… [and] the only point at which we approach this hard 
kernel of the Real is indeed the dream. When we awaken into reality after a dream, we usually say 
to ourselves 'it was just a dream', thereby blinding ourselves to the fact that in our everyday, 
wakening reality we are nothing but a consciousness of this dream… It is the same with the 
ideological dream, with the determination of ideology as a dreamlike construction hindering us 
from seeing the real state of things, reality as such” (Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 48). 
The recognition of the existence of commodity fetishism can never suffice to dispel the ideological 
fantasy. The fantasy is a real material framework that structures individual consciousness. 
Recognition of this fact is not an escape from it; it requires more than thought to change thought.  
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redundant system built around expanding value without recognizing that value is 
originally only a measurement of equivalence of use-values between 
commodities. Without money fetishism, use-value would be revealed as the 
primary form of value in a commodity, since value is derived from use-value. 
Rational economic agents (mythic beings whose existence the original theorists of 
capitalism presupposed) would lose faith in money as the universal embodiment 
of value and economic activity would have to be adjusted accordingly: the model 
of circulation and exchange would become C-M-C’. This is to say that the 
satisfaction of needs would take precedence over the expansion of wealth.  
     At this point, it is worth pointing out that money fetishism does not primarily 
function at the level of individual consciousness, but at the level of social 
consciousness. Marx asserts that the principle ideological result of fetishism is 
that people treat money as the actual body of wealth (value) “without being aware 
of it.”73 This claim would be almost absurd if it were made only at the level of the 
consciousness of the individual. After all, one can understand that money is 
worthless in and of itself while still using it to actually purchase goods.  
     The point is not that fetishism is an idea influencing the consciousness of 
individuals, but that it is a fantasy structuring social reality itself. Individual 
consciousness emerges from, or is the product of, social reality. Žižek 
compellingly articulates this point when he argues that the problem is not that 
                                               
73 Marx, Capital, 166-167. “Men do not therefore bring the products of labor into relation with 
each other in exchange as values because they see these objects merely as the material 
integuments of homogenous human labor. The reverse is true: by equating their different products 
to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labor as human labor. 
They do this without being aware of it.” 
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people cannot understand the chain of abstraction hidden behind the fetishistic 
illusion, but rather that 
in their social activity itself, in what they are doing, they are acting 
as if money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of 
wealth as such… What they ‘do not know’, what they 
misrecognize, is the fact that in their social reality itself, in their 
social activity–in the act of commodity exchange–they are guided 
by the fetishistic illusion.74 
 
What is being posited by Žižek is a dislocation of ideology from the 
consciousness of individuals to its existence as a real material force in social 
reality. Ideology is such a pervasive social force that recognizing and identifying, 
at the level of individual consciousness, structural flaws, which are located at the 
level of social reality, is simply not enough fix these flaws. Social consciousness 
is produced through social action and, therefore, in order to change social reality 
we must change the very ways in which we act. This is one key truth that 
fetishism keeps us from grasping.75 
     Now, in turning to the second characteristic of fetishism identified above, I can 
say that, by hiding the truth of the chain of abstractions from the conscious 
activity of economic agents, fetishism also obscures the fact that capitalism is 
inherently exploitative of labor. We must remember that the model of exchange in 
capitalist circulation follows the model M-C-M’. M’ is equal to M + MΔ, where 
M is the original value of the commodity and MΔ is the change in value of the 
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75 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 48: “In vain do we try to break out of this ideological 
dream by ‘opening our eyes and trying to see reality as it is’, by throwing away the ideological 
spectacles: as the subjects of such a post-ideological, objective, sober look, free of so-called 
ideological prejudices, as the subjects of a look which views the facts as they are, we remain 
throughout ‘the consciousness of our ideological dream’. The only way to break the power of our 
ideological dream is to confront the Real of our desire which announces itself in this dream.” 
 62 
commodity.76 Furthermore, M’ is supposed to represent more money than M if the 
exchange is profitable (as all good capitalist exchanges ought to be), and, for this 
reason, Marx calls MΔ “surplus-value”. The commodity at the heart of the 
exchange is really only there to facilitate the circulation of money according to 
the capitalist model. Therefore, when we remove this intermediary from the 
model, we are left with the formula M-M’, or, in Marx’s words, “‘money which 
begets money’, such is the description of capital given by its first interpreters, the 
Mercantilists.”77 We have now arrived at the answer to the question I posed in the 
second section of this chapter–namely, “what is capital?” Capital is money that 
begets money; it is the wealth (value) invested in the production of surplus-value.  
     This surplus value (MΔ) is converted into M’ in exchange, but this conversion 
cannot be located at the sphere of circulation. Certainly a commodity could be 
bought by one person and sold to another for a higher price, thereby generating 
profit, but at the level of an economic system–at the level of social reality–this 
practice cannot be the source of social capital, since there will be a loss of wealth 
on the part of the second person engaged in the exchange that is equivalent to the 
gain of the first participant. Something material must be added to the commodity 
in order for it to be sold at a higher price than that at which it was bought.  
     This brings the investigation of the origin of surplus value out of the sphere of 
circulation and into the sphere of production. Since the commodity is the 
expression of material and social relations of production, the value of a 
commodity cannot increase without an augmentation of the social/material 
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processes that produced it. In other words, something must be added to the 
commodity for its value to increase. In order to be exchanged for M’, the 
commodity must actually leave the market and enter the site of production as a 
raw material to be consumed by labor in the production of a new commodity. 
Because I am now jumping to a different sphere of the economic base, which is as 
yet untouched territory for this analysis, I will have to provide an outline of 
Marx’s theory of surplus-labor, from which surplus-value is derived. 
IV. MΔ’s Mirror and Origin: Surplus-Labor 
     Production in capitalism revolves around private ownership of the means of 
production. As we saw in chapter 2, those who own the tools used to produce 
commodities are capitalists. Capitalists utilize their wealth to hire those who have 
no source of wealth other than their labor-power. Class position is thus 
determined by one’s relation to the means of production: if you own the means of 
production and employ workers, you are a capitalist; if you sell your labor to the 
capitalist and produce commodities for him, you are a proletarian. Summarizing 
what we learned about class from chapters 2 and 3, class positions are derived 
from the structure of the economic base. The class relations that define an 
economic system are mediated by the means of production. This is to say that, in 
capitalism, the means of production forms the intermediary objective base upon 
which class relations are built. When a specific power-relation, ownership, is 
applied to the intermediary object, class positions come into being. In order to 
understand class positions, one must determine the principle of ownership of the 
means of production and understand how the products of labor are appropriated. 
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     I have already discussed the abstract valuation of labor-power, but have not yet 
fully emphasized that this abstract value is an exchange-value: (would-be) 
workers and capitalists first meet in the labor market where the workers sell the 
capitalists the one commodity they own in order to secure some means of 
subsistence (in the form of wages–in the form of money). Therefore, “the value of 
labor-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the 
maintenance of its owner.”78 In other words, labor-power is valued according to 
the cost of satisfying the needs of workers sufficiently enough to sustain their 
productive capabilities.79 The workers then make use of the capitalists’ means of 
production in order to shape raw-materials into refined commodities. It is in this 
actual economic activity of production that the use-value of the workers’ labor 
emerges and is consumed. It is from this difference between actual and potential, 
use and exchange, that surplus value is extracted: “The fact that half a day’s labor 
is necessary to keep a worker alive for 24 hours does not in any way prevent him 
from working a whole day.”80 The capitalist compensates a worker for day’s work 
with a day’s means of subsistence, but the actual productivity of the worker 
outpaces the value of the labor-power exchanged.  
     An entirely new series of relations immanent in the capitalist model of 
circulation now comes to light. To understand the importance of these new 
relations, I will rework Marx’s model of capitalist exchange, which is revealed to 
                                               
78 Marx, Capital, 274. 
79 Marx, Capital, 275. There is also an “historical and moral element” to the cost of the means of 
subsistence determined by the wealth of the society in which the worker lives. The value of a 
worker’s labor-power is not simply based on the cost of materials necessary to keep the worker 
from starving. 
80Marx, Capital, 300. 
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have a far more complex form than M-C-M’. On the market, the capitalist 
exchanges money (M) for a commodity (C), which becomes raw material for the 
production of a more valuable commodity. It is at this point that the commodity 
leaves the market and enters the factory. However, in order to produce this second 
commodity, the capitalist must first enter the labor market where he exchanges 
money (M) simultaneously for labor-power (L) and the means of production (P). 
Within the factory, the consumption of both labor-power and the means of 
production yields the use-value of labor, or “surplus-labor” (L’). This surplus 
labor then produces the more valuable commodity (C’), which then returns to the 
market where it is sold and exchanged for more money (M’).  
     The true representation of exchange now appears as M-C-<{M-(L+P)}-[L’-
C’]>-M’:81 The relation symbolized inside the curly brackets represents activity 
on the labor market and the relation inside the square brackets represents the 
activity of production. The symbols that are not bound represent the visible 
components model of exchange in capitalism and the stages bound by the arrows 
represent the steps of the production of value that are hidden by fetishism, which, 
it turns out, make up the vast majority of the value-form of capital. The big take-
away is this: capitalists pay workers enough to maintain their productivity and 
appropriate the actual value they produce, which is greater than the cost of their 
means of subsistence. In this sense, the expanded model of capitalist circulation–a 
chain that incorporates production–is also the model of capitalist exploitation. 
The fetishism of money, which abstracts value from its material root, also hides 
this exploitative nature of the circulation of labor and production by hiding the 
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most essential links in the chain: <{M-L+P}-[L’-C’]>. Thanks to money 
fetishism, “the seller of labor-power, like the seller of any other commodity, 
realizes its exchange-value, and alienates its use-value.”82 The money fetish does 
not simply lubricate the capitalist machine: it functions as the machine’s source of 
power. 
     There are a few powerful lessons to be learned from our journey through the 
economic underworld that is the sphere of production. First, production ought to 
be seen as a phase in the larger model of capitalist circulation. To exclude the 
links <{M-L+P}-[L’-C’]> from the formula of circulation is to completely ignore 
the role of labor and its exploitation in capitalism. If we simply accept the model 
M-C-M’, then we deny labor any agency and produce a fetishistic 
misrepresentation of the structure of social reality. Second, fetishism blinds 
workers to the real value of their labor, i.e., its use-value. Workers see money as 
the embodiment of value divorced from the social relations that produced it and 
thus fail to see that all exchange-value is merely the representation of equivalence 
between use-values; they fail to recognize use-value as the real root of value. 
Workers are compensated solely for the cost of the means of subsistence 
necessary for them to function as a means of production for the capitalist. This 
means that workers are paid a representation of value (wages as money) that is 
equivalent to the value of the social labor expended in the production of the 
means of subsistence that had to be consumed in order to maintain their continued 
productive existence. In other words, the value of the workers’ wages is a 
measurement of equivalence of use-values. This is the definition of exchange-
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value. It is the power of the money fetish that leads workers to alienate the use-
value of their labor for the exchange-value of their labor-power on the labor 
market.  
     Third, without fetishism the capitalist mode of circulation would be regarded 
as wildly irrational and unjust. To say that all capital is derived from the 
production of surplus-value is to say that all capital is built by surplus-labor, 
which is derived from the exploitation of workers by the capitalist. This mode of 
production does not serve the interests of all members of society, only those who 
own the means of production. The continued participation of labor in this 
exploitative system is therefore irrational and necessary for the functioning of 
capitalism. Fourth and finally, the fact that the entire economic base relies on a 
superstructural effect demands that we rethink the conceptual validity and value 
of the base/superstructure dichotomy. But before forging ahead with this task, one 
final critique must be considered.  
V. A Final Critique: A Defense of History 
 
     A critic may finally object to the analysis laid out thus far by claiming that my 
understanding of fetishism is fundamentally ahistorical. This softer economic 
determinist, a dialectical historian, would assert that fetishism is not uniquely 
rooted in capitalist economic practice; after all, Marx himself cites Aristotle’s 
critique of money fetishism in his analysis of the capitalist model of circulation.83 
This dialectical historical position would rightly assert that there was no social 
state of nature in which capitalism functioned solely as an economic mode of 
production that then produced all other aspects of society later. Instead, this critic 
                                               
83 Marx, Capital, 267.  
 68 
would posit that capitalism emerged from a larger history made up of a succession 
of modes of production. Fetishism would simply be a “tradition of all past 
generations [that] weighs like a nightmare upon the brain of the living.”84 The 
existence of fetishism would not need to be explained solely within a capitalist 
paradigm in order for it to be considered a superstructural effect. This particular 
superstructural effect can be seen as the echo of a material economic force when 
its theoretically primordial origins are kept in mind. This objection would at least 
grant some causal power to superstructural effects like fetishism, but only after it 
is made clear that they have their own specific economic origins. In this sense, the 
positivist deployment of the base/superstructure concept has already been 
rethought. This revision, however, has not gone far enough.  
     Though this criticism is right to point out that capitalism emerged from a 
dynamic historical process, it is wrong to assert that the money and commodity 
fetishism that drives the capitalist economy existed as a definite social 
consciousness before capitalism. As we have already discovered, there is an 
important distinction to be made between fetishism as a “definite social 
consciousness” and the individual behavior of fetishism. With Žižek’s help, we 
discovered that social consciousness is produced through social action. Fetishism 
as a definite mode of social consciousness is an ideological fantasy that structures 
economic practice and, for this reason, is located firmly in what has been referred 
to as the economic base. Of course, there are examples of money fetishists 
throughout history, but, by and large, the fetishistic fantasy was not a dominant 
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Company, 1978), 595. This famous passage is taken from the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.  
 69 
mode of social consciousness. The moneylender that Aristotle criticizes does not 
derive his wealth from workers who willingly alienate the use-value of their labor 
for the exchange-value of their labor-power. There is certainly pervasive 
economic exploitation in the Athenian economy; however, the exploitation of 
labor is not defined by the relation of wage-slavery, but by actual slavery. The 
slave’s reality does not need to be, and perhaps cannot be, structured by the 
fetishistic fantasy when they are so overtly exploited by material power relations. 
“A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician 
binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas… on the soft fibers 
of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest of Empires.”85 Slave-
owners in Athens were “stupid despots,” but the capitalist is a true politician.86 
Certainly in Athens there were individuals who engaged in fetishistic practices, 
but it was not a definite mode of social consciousness structuring all of social 
reality. 
     Let me not restrict my counterexamples to Classical Greece. The Medieval 
Catholic Church outlawed money lending.87 In the case of the Church, since it 
was official religious doctrine, it was heretical to charge interest on loans of 
money. The reason for this was that there is no material basis on which the 
interest on the loan could be justified. The Catholic state apparatus regarded 
making money from money as a dangerous sin. The production of capital and the 
money fetishism on which it is based was the work of the devil.  
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87 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social 
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     Additionally, the dominant economic mode of production for the late medieval 
period, feudalism, did not produce fetishism as a mode of social consciousness. 
The static hierarchy of the feudal system was not built around a principle of 
exchanging commodities for money. The aristocratic class exploited the labor of 
the mass of agricultural peasants, who had to produce enough goods to satisfy 
their own needs as well as the needs of the knights who “watched over” them. The 
peasants had no say in this. They could not move or change professions. Peasants 
were born into servitude and died in servitude. They did not see compensation for 
their labor, but only received tenants’ rights to farmland and the promise of 
protection from the lord to whom they were loyal, and only so long as they were 
loyal. For the vast majority of people in the feudal system, money hardly entered 
their world except to buy use-values that they would consume. Properly speaking, 
commodities did not exist in this mode of production, since a product of labor 
only becomes a commodity after it has been exchanged in the sphere of 
circulation.  
     By overlooking these key differences between capitalism and previous 
economic epochs, and  by ignoring the distinction between fetishism as an 
economic practice and fetishism as a definite mode of social consciousness, my 
critic would not have presented a defense of history, but a fundamental 
misrepresentation of the interplay of history and economics. The recognition of 
the fact that fetishism is a definite mode of social consciousness that is unique to 
the capitalist mode of production is at the same time a recognition and a defense 
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of the dynamic movement of history. With this last response, the economic 
determinist position has been sufficiently destabilized, if not refuted altogether.  
VI. Dissolution of Base and Superstructure 
     The preceding analysis reveals that the strict base/superstructure division is not 
a viable concept. Commodity fetishism, a superstructural effect according to the 
traditional Marxist formulation of the base/superstructure dichotomy, must 
necessarily be presupposed as a precondition of capitalist economic activity if 
Marx’s theory of exploitation is to make any sense. Moreover, this fetishism 
cannot be presupposed as an ideological specter of a previous economic epoch 
that allowed for the passage from feudalism to capitalism, since as a definite 
mode of social consciousness, it must be a product of social labor organized 
around the production of exchange-values and the alienation of use-values. The 
feudal mode of production, however, was organized around the production of use-
values. Commodity fetishism, as a definite mode of social consciousness, is 
uniquely linked to the bourgeois mode of production both as a paradoxical 
precondition and as a product. That is to say that capitalism requires that the 
practice of all social agents–proletarians and capitalists, as well as those 
belonging to other classes existing alongside this central class-antagonism (the 
dangerous class and the petty-bourgeoisie that we encountered in chapter 2)–
reinforce and be driven by the ideological fetishism of the exchange-value of the 
commodity.  
     By now, it should not be a secret that at the heart of the base/superstructure 
dichotomy was a claim made about the way in which reality fundamentally 
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functions. If everything we observe in the social can be explained exclusively 
with recourse to economic activity, then theorists need only unpack the total set of 
determining economic relations so that revolutionaries can go about 
deconstructing and reorganizing all of reality. One cannot help delighting in the 
pragmatic optimism of a political theory that posited an attainable and 
unquestionable truth in the form of an autonomous and determinate economic 
Real, which could be used to bring about a more just world. In some sense, it is 
unfortunate that there is no autonomous economic base, at least not in the simple 
terms that the positivist Marxists envisioned it. We must now ask if this is truly 
how Marx envisioned his metaphysical/epistemological division of the social.  
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5. A New Topography of Social 
Reality 
Towards a New Ontological Foundation for Class 
 
 
     The question that has been central to this work is a question of the political 
ontology of the concept of class. We have seen how the term does not designate a 
coherent conceptual unity in the writing of Marx and Engels, and also how the 
multiple concepts of class have haunted Marxist thought throughout the 20th 
century. For a brief moment, it appeared that we had at least found a plane of 
consistency for the various concepts of class in the autonomous and determinate 
sphere of the economy. However, the analysis of the last chapter demonstrated the 
incompatibility of Marx’s theory of capitalist economics with economic 
determinist models of Marxism and, in doing so, revealed that the tidy distinction 
between the infrastructure (economy or private sphere) and the superstructure 
(public sphere or all society aside from the economy) is not a valid topography of 
social reality.  Moreover, not only “class,” but also “society” and “capitalism” 
became floating signifiers with the dissolution of this Marxist topography. 
     The intertwining of the ideological and the economic aspects of society forces 
us to seek a new model of understanding the “social whole,” as Althusser phrased 
it. I will begin again by returning to some writings of Marx and Engels via 
Michael Halewood’s Rethinking the Social through Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and 
Whitehead to understand how Marx and Engels discuss social reality before it is 
filtered through a theory of economic determinism. In this section of the chapter, I 
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will develop a new distinction between the concepts of sociality and society 
deployed by Marx and Engels. After establishing a new terminology and using it 
to develop a rudimentary topography of social reality, the forthcoming analysis 
will look to Étienne Balibar, as well as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in order 
to make sense of the position of class within this new framework. 
I. The Social/Societal Distinction 
     The distinction between the social and society lays the groundwork for a 
theory of historical change and continuity in the absence of a model built from a 
base/superstructure distinction. The two are linked, then, in their conceptual 
purposiveness. But one should not simply understand this new distinction as a sort 
of rewording of the same problem in Marxist political theory. The 
base/superstructure was a vertical model of society in which the upper level was 
always determined by the movement of the lower level. This lower level was the 
mode of production, and the development of the economy was guided by a 
dialectical logic that would be reproduced at the level of politics and society more 
broadly. This means that economic determinism gets translated into historical 
determinism in which the success of the proletarian revolution is guaranteed by 
the logical development of the mode of production.88 For the purposes of this 
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argument, this deterministic logic will not play a role in the development of the 
distinction between the social and society.  
     This illustration of the social/societal distinction will build on Michael 
Halewood’s terminological analysis of the use of the words “social,” “societal,” 
and “society” by Marx and Engels. Halewood’s work reveals that this distinction 
between the social and society is at least somewhat present at the origins of the 
Marxist tradition. His terminological dissection begins with a rereading of A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In this work, Marx 
uses two words for “society”: “gesellschaft” and “sozietät.” The former was used 
by Hegel to define “civil society,” while the latter does not appear in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right at all. The term’s absence from the work Marx is critiquing 
indicates that Marx’s use of sozietät is driving at a differentiated meaning 
between the two, and this difference allows Marx to highlight another aspect of 
social reality. As Halewood writes, “[s]ozietät has the connotation of a local, joint 
practice, which does not have a set of rules but comes about through common 
interests.”89 Later Halewood adds, that: “[b]y deploying a term which Hegel does 
not use, Marx is distancing himself from the apparently rational but wholly 
theoretical account that Hegel is attempting to construct. Marx wants to bring in 
the messy but real, material, lives of individuals which, in an important way, also 
make them what they are.”90 So, it appears that in using sozietät, Marx is 
attempting to differentiate the ideal structure of the concept of society from the 
actual and overdetermined play of material forces out of which a society emerges.  
                                               
89 Michael Halewood, Rethinking the Social through Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Whitehead 
(London: Anthem Press, 2014), 64. 
90 Ibid, 66. 
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     Halewood goes on to argue that the fact that “sozietät” is used most frequently 
with reference to feudal society indicates that the Marx’s usage of the term lines 
up with an historical development from “sozietät” to “civil society.” Marx states 
that “in the Middle Ages property, trade, society [sozietät], man are political;… 
every private sphere has a political character or is a political sphere; that is, 
politics is a characteristic of the private spheres too.”91 Civil society, on the other 
hand, is characterized by an “abstract dualism” through which individual citizens 
become split between their freedom in private life (economic activity) and their 
subjection to a state apparatus that appears outside of that life (the public realm).92 
To summarize Halewood’s argument thus far, “gesellschaft” refers to “society” in 
the limited sense of “civil society” or “bourgeois society,” while “sozietät” refers 
to the underlying social reality out of which bridges the public and private spheres 
in previous epochs. Halewood asserts that by using sozietät in this way, Marx is 
highlighting that Hegel’s understanding of “society” as “gesellschaft” is specific 
to an historical epoch: the age of capitalism. The distinction between public and 
private that is tied in with “gesellschaft” is, then, both an abstraction and an 
historical reality–the public/private division is a defining feature of capitalist 
society. 
                                               
91 Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, 22. Halewood, Rethinking the Social…, 63. The bracketed 
German terms are included in Halewood’s quotation of the same passages of The German 
Ideology. The quotes used here have been cited in The Marx-Engels Reader to give the reader a 
reference consistent with other chapters of this work. Additionally, many of the quotes used here 
are either abbreviated or lengthier than those used by Halewood.  
92 The conjunction of public and private in feudal societies is a result of the fact that property 
relations are legally determined and inextricably linked to the political form of the state–relations 
between vassals and lords were simultaneously political and economic. “The dislocation of the 
political from the civil is premised on the freedom of the private sphere, of individuals to 
apparently pursue their own interests, separately from the requirements of their family status and 
social position…” Halewood, Rethinking the Social…, 65. 
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     The rationale behind the gesellschaft/sozietät split is complicated and clarified 
in passages of The German Ideology where Marx uses both terms to refer to 
communist society. As Halewood Argues: 
Marx envisages communist society in terms of Gesellschaft not 
Sozietät. That is, communism, considered as a society, is not a 
return to a previous societal formation but shares features of 
modern capitalist society. More important though is the retention 
of the adjective sozial to express the difference between “free” 
social activity and the objectification of such social activity which 
becomes external to us, returns to haunt us, in the societal 
formation of the historical development of societies up until now… 
It would seem that within communism we could indulge our social 
(sozial) activities even if communism is conceived of as a society 
in terms of Gesellschaft.93 
 
We can see that a conception of society as sozietät and a conception of society as 
gesellschaft are not as distinct as the analysis of the Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy would suggest. If gesellschaft is an historical development 
unique to capitalist society, then it does not necessarily supplant sozietät. Sozietät 
represents a qualitatively different form of society that can intersect or overlap 
with gesellschaft. Neither is reducible to the other.  
     Halewood argues that by linking sozietät and gesellschaft to their respectively 
correlated adjectives (sozial and gesellschaftlich), we can begin to understand 
how the two are differentiated. Earlier in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels 
provide a brief clarification of their use of gesellschaftlich:  
By soci[et]al [gesellschaftlich] we understand the co-operation of 
several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what 
manner, and to what end… [A] certain mode of production… is 
always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, or soci[et]al 
                                               
93 Halewood, Rethinking the Social…, 74. 
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[gesellschaftlicher] stage… the multitude of productive forces 
accessible to men determines the nature of society.94  
 
From this passage I can say that, at least as it is deployed in The German 
Ideology, gesellschaft is a neutral and transhistorical term referring to the idea of 
society in general and not to the specific societal form in a given historical epoch; 
it is the mode of cooperation considered in the abstract and not under specific 
conditions. Furthermore, because of the vague definition of “societal” as 
cooperation of individuals in any matter toward any end, I can add that this 
definition of the mode of cooperation is not essentially economic, though it plays 
a central role in economic activity.  
     The more interesting lesson that should be drawn out of this definition of 
gesellschaftlich is the fact that it is the “multitude of productive forces accessible 
to men” that determines the character of a gesellschaft. This is remarkable when 
considered alongside the definition for “social power” (“soziale Macht”) that 
Marx and Engels provide a few pages later: “The social power [soziale Macht], 
i.e., the multiple productive force, which arises through the co-operation of 
different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour…”95 In the 
preceding paragraph the gesellschaft was determined by “the multitude of 
productive forces” which, as we have now seen, is the definition of sozial macht. 
And yet now it appears that the sozial power is itself determined by the general 
division of labor. It would seem, then, that society is determined by social power, 
                                               
94 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 157; Halewood, Rethinking the Social…, 75. For 
the sake of specificity, “gesellschaftlich” will be translated in this chapter as “societal” and not as 
“social” (as it was translated in the above quote). This makes particular sense in the case of the 
passage above because it is derived from the same root as the final word of the quote, which is 
translated as “society” in the English. 
95 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 161; Halewood, Rethinking the Social…, 74. 
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which is determined by economic structure and that this search for a new 
topography of the social beyond the base/superstructure has only resurrected the 
economic determinism that failed us earlier–with the incredibly important caveat 
that we have now found an intermediary between the economic base and the 
ideological and institutional superstructure in the movement of social power.  
     Such a reading, however, would miss the crucial context for the definition of 
sozial Macht within The German Ideology. In the full passage, Marx and Engles 
are actually saying that when the accessibility of the multitude of productive 
forces to men is determined by the division of labor, social power  
appears to these individuals, since their cooperation is not 
voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united 
power, but as an alien force existing outside them… which they 
thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a 
peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the 
action of man.96 
 
The spontaneous movement of gesellschaft is therefore secured by the alienation 
of individuals from the soziale macht, which is rooted in their cooperative 
conjunction with the multitude of productive forces. Furthermore, “this mode of 
cooperation is itself a ‘productive force’”–i.e., both societal and economic.97  
     The societal (gesellschaftlich) mode of cooperation is a productive force that 
makes possible the multiplication of other productive forces. The societal mode of 
cooperation should be thought of as the prism through which other productive 
forces must pass in order to be multiplied and thereby to constitute social power. 
The alienation of social power from individuals, who comprise the societal mode 
of cooperation, originates from the division of labor–a societal limitation imposed 
                                               
96 Marx and Engels , The Marx-Engels Reader, 161. 
97 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 157.  
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on the free social activity of individuals. This means that social power is not 
determined by the division of labor in the sense that the latter produces the 
former, but in the sense that it limits the potential form of social power. In other 
words, it would be better to say that though the division of labor conditions social 
power, the sociality from which social power is derived, is irreducible to the 
structure of the economic mode of production.  
II. Nature 
     In order to further develop an understanding of the interplay of these concepts 
of social reality, it may be important to briefly depart from Halewood’s analysis 
and note a distinction between the two German words that are translated as 
“nature” in the English versions of The German Ideology–namely, “zustand” and 
“natur.” The word used earlier in the German Ideology to assert that “the 
multitude of productive forces” (soziale macht) determines the nature of society, 
as gesellschaft, is “zustand,” which is commonly translated as “state” or 
“condition.” Thus it is bears a more temporary or contingent meaning than the 
English use of nature in a phrase like the “state of nature,” for example. However, 
when Marx and Engels are discussing the way in which individuals see their 
social power as something alien because “their cooperation is not voluntary but 
has come about naturally,” the German word that is translated as “naturally” is 
“naturwüchsig,” and it is more directly related to nature in a scientific or 
ecological sense. These vastly different connotations are made explicit when 
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Marx and Engels write that “the natural conditions [Naturbedingungen] in which 
man finds himself–geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on.”98 
     Moreover, before they give their definition of gesellschaftlich, Marx and 
Engels write: “The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life 
in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, 
and on the other hand as a social relationship.”99 “Natural” here is “natürliches” in 
the German and bears an intimate etymological relation to “naturwüchsig.”100 It 
would appear then, that Marx and Engels are using these terms to differentiate 
two levels of material reality: “natural” refers to a qualitatively distinct level of 
reality other than the level referred to as “societal” (gesellschaftlich). The latter 
may be understood as natural only secondarily–e.g., as an anthropological nature 
that humanity develops from biological nature.101 The use of the word “natural” to 
refer to the form of social power (soziale macht) determined by the division of 
labor seems, however, to blur this line: it refers to the division of labor as a 
(societal) limitation imposed upon social power. Social power, therefore, can be 
seen as the conjunction of the productive forces of humanity and of nature that is 
limited by specific societal formations such as the division of labor.  
     Social power is the intermediary between nature and society at the same time 
as it is the intermediary between the base and the superstructure. The mode of 
cooperation is a productive force of society, whereas social power is the multitude 
                                               
98 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 149-150. The original German words for nature 
were found in: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie (Berlin: Verlag Detlev 
Auvermann KG Glashütten im Taunus, 1970), 10. 
99 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 157. 
100 Marx and Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, 19, 23. 
101 This is just what Robert C. Tucker does in his introduction to The Marx-Engels Reader: 
“Original nature is overlaid with a man-made or ‘anthropological nature’” (xxiv). 
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of productive forces accessible to humanity. Social power is the emergence of 
productive forces from outside of society through the societal mode of 
cooperation, which is itself a productive force. Social power determines the 
character of society, but is also conditioned by the division of labor, which limits 
the horizon of the emergence of social power. The regulation of the mode of 
cooperation through the division of labor attempts to limit the influx or 
multiplication of productive forces from outside of the society. As Halewood 
argues, “[t]here is always a manner, a mode, in which cooperation occurs. It is not 
that society is a fixed object; there is no such ‘thing’ as capitalism. It gains its 
strength and its existence through the extent to which it informs ways of doing 
things.”102 The mode of cooperation, then, is the point at which society opens onto 
the social and it must be meticulously managed by capitalism if capitalism is to 
continue to exist. When Halewood declares that there is no such “thing” as 
capitalism, he is pointing out that there is never a closed capitalist system, but 
rather only a regular pattern of capitalist accumulation and expansion of wealth 
that requires the management of the mode of cooperation through the division of 
labor. Social power is the source of power for every society, but it is not 
generated within a societal structure; it is channeled through a specific societal 
mode of cooperation from outside of that societal form: “Capitalist relations may 
be the preponderant societal relations but there are always other ‘social’ relations 
which both reinforce and inhibit such relations. The most important point is that 
there is a tension between the two. Nothing is settled.”103 
                                               
102 Halewood, Rethinking the Social…, 129. 
103 Ibid, 129 
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III. Notes Towards a New Topography 
     From Halewood’s discursive analysis and my own rereading of The German 
Ideology, I have derived a terminology of the social from the works of Marx and 
Engels. I have also begun to develop a new topography of the social beyond the 
base and superstructure. Yet, the rough sketch of a theory of the social that was 
just outlined is neither Marx’s nor Engels’. By working with the specific 
terminology deployed by these thinkers, I am simply looking to root a theory of 
the social in a distinctly Marxist discourse. This will allow hopefully allow me to 
work towards a new social theory that maintains the integrity and validity of 
Marx’s theory of exploitation while also providing a new ontological foundation 
for classes. In order to be clear, then, about the development of my discourse on 
the social, let me briefly pause here to review some definitions.  
     First, “society” (gesellschaft) is an abstract, and general structure of productive 
human relations. In other words, the character of a society is determined by the 
mode of production. In capitalist society, there is a disjunction of public and 
private through which the state controls or manages the relations of the public 
sphere, while the division of labor manages the private sphere. Second, “societal” 
(gesellschaftlich-) designates an abstract mode of cooperation of individuals. 
Different modes of cooperation correspond to different societies: “it follows from 
this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined 
with a certain mode of cooperation, or soci[et]al stage, and this mode of 
cooperation is itself a productive force.”104 Thus the mode of cooperation–the 
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societal–is always subsumed under a definite form of society. That said, a given 
form of society does not include or determine all of human reality.  
     Third, this analysis establishes that behind both the state apparatus (which 
controls the public sphere of society) and the economic division of labor (which 
manages the private sphere), there is social power (sozial Macht). Halewood 
points toward this idea of social reality that is irreducible to the societal structures 
which attempt to manage it when he draws a distinction “between the general 
organization of a particular society (Gesellschaft) which makes up the totality of 
the relations which consist at a given moment, and the social might of the 
multiplied productive force. The social (sozial), as has been seen, invokes both 
more and less than the societal relations of Gesellschaft.”105 Social power, as the 
multiplied productive forces, is given societal expression through its conjunction 
with the means of cooperation. Because social power is irreducible to a given 
society, it poses a threat at the same time as it is the source of societal wealth. It 
must, therefore, be managed by society through the state, through ideology, and 
through the division of labor. Capital attempts to subsume the productive forces 
of social power, but these productive forces can also be weaponized by the 
masses: social power is both a potential source of wealth and a potential 
revolutionary force.  
     Fourth and finally, I argue that if social power is derived from outside of a 
given society or societal form, then this outside can be recognized as something 
distinct, and this will here be given the term “sociality” (roughly analogous to 
sozietät). Sociality should be thought of as a smooth space upon which societal 
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territories are inscribed. These territories limit the potential influx of social power 
through the state–a reification of legal and illegal political relations–and the 
division of labor–a reification of legitimate and illegitimate property relations. 
Borrowing terminology that will be vital to a later section of this chapter, I will 
say that societal power is developed by transcendent apparatuses of control that 
seek to manage social power, which is immanent in material reality conceived of 
as sociality.106  
     As we discovered in the preceding chapter, in order to establish the capitalist 
division of labor on the smooth space of sociality, economic relations must first 
be fetishized. That is, social power must be channeled through an economic 
division of labor predicated on a fetishized societal consciousness.107 One could 
argue that ideology is the hegemonic link that makes capitalism into a coherent 
form of society by bridging the apparatuses of control in the public and private 
spheres. The most important conclusion to be drawn from this rough outline of a 
social theory is a reformulation of the fact that classes are products of the division 
of labor: they are territorialized identities that belong to a given society. The point 
of the proletarian revolution, however, is to liberate productive forces from the 
division of labor and, therefore, the proletariat cannot be a revolutionary class 
without also dismantling its own class identity.  
IV. State, Economy, and Sociality 
                                               
106 For more on the idea of transcendent apparatuses, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “Two 
Europes, Two Modernities”, in Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 74-83. 
107 Halewood reveals that the “definite modes of social consciousness” referred to by Marx in A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and again in Capital, are referred to as 
“gesellschaftliches” in the German. Given the schema I have just laid out, it would therefore be 
more appropriate to refer to them as “definite modes of societal consciousness.” Halewood, 
Rethinking the Social…, 61. 
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      The four conclusions that can be drawn from the distinction between sociality 
and society still do little to clarify how society functions or what it is. In order to 
develop this line of thought, the division of bourgeois society into the state and 
the division of labor as two means of maintaining a regular pattern of productivity 
must be subjected to further investigation. In Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on 
Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, Étienne Balibar sheds some light 
on the politico-economic functioning of society in a section titled “In Search of 
the Proletariat: The Notion of Class Politics in Marx.” Late in this piece, Balibar 
argues that  
the labor relation (as a relation of exploitation) is immediately 
economic and political; the form of the "economic community" 
and that of the state "grow" simultaneously out of this "basis." 
There can therefore be no ambiguity: if there are "mediations;' 
neither do they take place between pre-existing economic and 
political spheres, nor does one originate from a pre-existing other. 
Rather, the formation and the evolution of each of them occurs 
from their permanent common basis, which precisely explains the 
"correlation" that remains between the two. In other words, the 
relations of the exploitation of labor are both the "seed" of the 
market ("economic community") and the seed of the state 
(sovereignty/ servitude).108 
 
Bourgeois ideology divides social reality into separates spheres of economics and 
politics and, through Hegel, brings with this division the idea that the economic 
evolves out of the state. Marx’s own analysis of society has been frequently read 
as a reversal of the Hegelian logic regarding the determinant relation between the 
state and civil society.109 In this traditional reading, Marx argues that the state 
                                               
108 Étienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After 
Marx, trans. James Swenson (New York: Routledge, 1994), 138-139. 
109 For example, Robert C. Tucker writes that “One could discover social reality… by turning 
Hegel ‘right side up’… Marx inverted the Hegelian proposition on the relation between the state 
and “civil society” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft, by which Hegel meant the realm of private 
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evolves out of civil society. According to Balibar, however, the real Marxist 
subversion of bourgeois ideology is in the rejection of the division between the 
two spheres. This subversion is done by asserting that the public and private 
spheres are both erected on a third principle–the labor relation–that is irreducible 
to either sphere.  
     The labor-relation is always something more than societal; it is not limited to 
the system of capitalism in an exclusively economic sense and it is for this very 
reason that the labor-relation produces effects outside of the economic realm. The 
labor relation that overspills the economic and the political, and which is also the 
basis for these two spheres, is, moreover, a relation of exploitation. And here, 
through Balibar, we return to our earlier discussion of the theory of exploitation: 
“What Marx calls exploitation is a process with two sides, neither of which has a 
privileged position over the other; they are designated by the two correlative 
terms surplus labor and surplus value…”110 Surplus labor is the difference 
between the socially necessary labor, symbolized by money, that the capitalist 
used to purchase labor-power and the value actually produced by the labor that 
was bought: it is the unpaid labor that generates value appropriated by the 
capitalist. This appropriated value is surplus-value–“the ‘abstract’ movement of 
the valorization of value, or the differential in the increase of capital.”111 The 
extraction of surplus-labor and its valorization as surplus-value is what defines the 
exploitative labor-relation of capitalism; it is  
                                                                                                                                            
economic endeavor). Civil society was not an outgrowth of the state, as in Hegel’s view; rather, 
the state was an outgrowth of civil society” (The Marx-Engels Reader, xxiii-xxiv). 
110 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, 139. 
111 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, 139. 
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a social relation in which labor-power is treated as a ‘commodity,’ 
and occurs only to the extent that it can be so treated (for it does 
resist). In other words, [this] self-movement [of capitalism] 
presupposes a series of unstable conditions, some created in the 
sphere of production (labor discipline and habits, a hierarchy of 
skills and salaries, etc.), and others created ‘outside’ of this sphere, 
in the ‘social’ space supervised by the state.112 
 
The phrase “self-movement of capitalism” is taken from Marx’s Capital and 
refers to the pattern of regularity that defines the capitalist system. Combining this 
notion of the self-movement of capitalism with Halewood’s assertion that 
capitalism is not a “thing” in the sense of a static and self-contained unity, I can 
say that the self-movement of capitalism is its exploitation of labor in order to 
valorize surplus labor as surplus value. Labor carried out at the level of the mode 
of cooperation–the point at which society opens up to its exteriority in sociality–
must be restricted and managed by a whole series of technologies that maintain 
the exploitative relationship and repress other productive possibilities that would 
rupture the societal territory. These restrictive technologies are conditions that 
secure the reproduction of the societal regularity: that is to say that these 
technologies, both economic and political, are ideological constraints placed upon 
social power.  
      Balibar reveals another side of the labor relation when he asserts that labor-
power resists being treated as a commodity. The mode of cooperation is the 
societal organization of social activity, but there is activity that overspills the 
mode of cooperation itself. The mode of cooperation is the initial societal territory 
carved out of sociality, the ground of social reality: “the analysis of exploitation 
implies that any soci[et]al relation must be the organization of a material 
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constraint upon social groups defined as a function of the nature of this 
constraint.”113 It is in this way that the division of labor produces classes through 
a series of technologies of power that produce the bodies they seek to control. But 
the entities produced by the techniques of power also resist these technologies. 
The territorializing movement of society implies the deterritorializing force of 
sociality; this fundamental antagonism determines the boundaries of the possible 
as it is envisioned from within the scope of a society, and it is for this reason that 
“proletarian demands are directly perceived, in the [societal] space of the 
dominant ideology, as ‘nonpolitical,’ even if in order to obtain such a result a 
whole arsenal of forms of state action must be deployed.”114 The state–a 
transcendent apparatus of control over the sociality, which is territorialized as the 
public realm–must enact a series of operations in order to maintain the distinction 
between public and private. This is done in order to keep social power from 
emerging as both a political and economic force that can be harnessed by the 
exploited and dominated as a revolutionary force. But this abstract formulation is 
as yet unclear. 
     In any case, the most important insight that Balibar has provided us is that 
classes are produced by the division of labor and a host of other requisite 
technologies of power that secure the pattern of regularity that defines the society. 
But these classes do not themselves pose a threat to the societal structure; the very 
social power that is managed and subsumed within capital is the real radical force 
of change. That is to say, the “working-class” is itself the product of a societal 
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territorialization (according to the division of labor and the mode of production). 
And, now we must discover what the material components of classes are in order 
to understand how societal change is even possible. What I am really asking is: 
beyond the territorial production or “classification” of the “working-class,” what 
is the vital force that makes societal change thinkable? 
V. From Class to Mass to Multitude 
     Balibar argues that there is a dual sense to the being of the proletariat. It 
appears to surface in Marx’s writing as either a class or a mass and sometimes as 
both. Balibar Writes: “In The German Ideology,” for instance, “only the 
bourgeoisie is a ‘class’; the proletariat, on the contrary, is defined as a ‘mass’, as 
the last product of the decomposition of society. This definition precisely makes it 
the agent for a communist revolution in which no ‘particular’ interest (no ‘class 
interest’) need be advanced.”115 This interpretation of the proletariat further 
complicates a Marxist understanding social reality. Society is made up of classes 
and to some extent is determined by them in the sense that the division of labor 
conditions the mode of cooperation through which social power is realized and 
determines the conditions of society in general. But now there is, aside from 
classes, the existence of a mass (if not a plurality of masses) that is supposed to 
transcend or subvert class distinctions.  
     Balibar adds that the ontology of “mass,” much like the ontology of “class,” 
has never been fully clarified within the Marxist tradition, but that the concept of 
deployment of the term “mass”  
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keeps oscillating between the description of a social condition, in 
which the “communal bonds” of traditional societies are collapsing 
and a radical isolation of individuals is emerging, and the 
description of a movement, in which the diversity of conditions is 
covered over by a common “consciousness” or ideology which 
aims at the transformation of the existing order.116 
 
In other words, the emergence of masses as political beings coincides with a 
societal crisis in which the mode of cooperation specific to a given society seems 
to be in the process of dissolving–i.e., there is an atomization of social entities as 
traditional identities collapse–while at the same time there is a movement toward 
a greater collective power outside of the societally restricted boundaries of the 
possible. Putting this in the context of the critical moment of chapter 2, in which 
we saw Marx giving up on defining the concept of class in the third volume of 
Capital, I could say that the ideological links that bind classes together unravel to 
reveal the social disunity upon which the societal order is founded. At the same 
time as class identities unravel, however, the movement of social power develops 
into a revolutionizing constitutive moment in which the entire societal order is 
transformed.  
     The conceptual bridge that makes this dissolution of societally produced and 
mediated subjectivities coincide with a constitution of a collective and 
revolutionized social power is the concept of population. In Capital, Marx argues 
that “a surplus population of workers is a necessary product of… [and] a 
condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production.”117 Later in this 
same text, he argues that the development of the capitalist mode of production in 
different spheres of economic activity produces specific population flows: as 
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agriculture is incorporated into the capitalist mode of production and its 
productivity is enhanced both by the use of machinery and through capitalist 
techniques of management, for example, the requisite number of agricultural 
workers falls and workers are forced to look to cities for employment.118 “Part of 
the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into 
an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on the lookout for opportunities to 
complete this transformation.”119 During the birth of capitalism, at a macro-level, 
then, society attempts to control and establish regular patterns of population 
development according to developments and sanctions of economic and legal 
apparatuses. As Balibar argues, “[f]rom this point of view, the concept of 
population in Marx is the mediation par excellence between the idea of ‘class’ 
and the idea of ‘mass.’ And I could go so far as to say that ‘population 
movements’ are the main basis of explanation for ‘mass movements.’”120  
     To better frame this within the context of my analysis of Michael Halewood 
and The German Ideology, let me say that population now appears as a double 
relationship. On the one hand, it is societally regulated (by law and commerce) 
and stratified (by the division of labor); on the other hand, it is the natural root of 
social power.121 To say that population control is a precondition and a production 
of capitalism’s pattern of regularity is then to say that capitalism is not only an 
economically or politically exploitative societal form; it also requires a network of 
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manufacturing. 
119 Marx, Capital, 796. 
120 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, 146. 
121 For the multiple sub-classes within the proletariat that are developed by the capitalist law of 
population, see Marx, Capital, 794-802. 
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biopolitical regulation, which is expanded and intensified with the development of 
bourgeois society.122 
     I can now put forward the thesis that the regulation of the mode of cooperation 
is precisely this biopolitical aspect of capitalist society, and this becomes clear 
when I stress that the sociality of cooperation as it is defined in The German 
Ideology applies not only to cooperative labor, but also to any cooperative 
intercourse, and is specifically connected to procreation. The mode of cooperation 
is active in determining society not only in terms of its economic or political 
productivity, but also in terms of its regulation and production of life. Capital, and 
its value-form, attempts to subsume all of life, not just economically productive 
labor.  
     From what has just been said, I can assert that masses are vital entities that 
exist on the plane of sociality and are regulated within societal territories. They 
are territorialized as classes by societal apparatuses of control (economic, 
political, and biopolitical). Classes, therefore, cannot be revolutionary, since the 
specificity of their existence is a production of the techniques of power that seek 
to dominate and exploit their underlying social power. The proletariat, for this 
very reason, is not, strictly speaking, a “class.” Rather, the proletariat is the mass 
that is partially territorialized, or incorporated into society, as the working-class. 
Balibar is correct in asserting that the revolutionary proletariat is a mass. But, to 
facilitate dialogue with other thinkers who address a very similar set of issues, I 
                                               
122 The developments of workers housing and, later, company towns represent some of the most 
crude forms of the expansion of biopolitical power in capitalism.  
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should say that the revolutionary potential of the proletariat is rooted in the 
multitude.123 
VI. A Brief Refrain 
     The Marxist terminology that was derived earlier provided me with an 
excellent groundwork for constructing a new theory of social reality. Michael 
Halewood’s work helped me to examine how some inchoate distinctions between 
society and sociality already exist in Marx. By clarifying some definitions for the 
four terms deployed by Marx and Engels with reference to social reality, I was 
able to develop a new topography of the social in place of the base/ superstructure 
model. The work of Étienne Balibar fleshed out this rudimentary theory with a 
precise consideration of the ontology of classes beyond economic determinism. It 
is imperative now, however, that I review the developments of this analysis in 
order to ensure that I maintain conceptual clarity.  
     In the first section, I argued that “society” is a territorialization of “sociality” 
that orders the chaos of the latter according to a pattern of regularity that defines 
the former. Society is the hierarchized territory inscribed on sociality. Sociality is 
a smooth space of being that is not, as yet ordered–it is immanent social reality.124 
This departs from the relations of determination that define the 
base/superstructure model in that in this new theory there is no hierarchical 
                                               
123 In the first chapter of Masses, Classes, Ideas, Balibar analyzes the radical democratic politics 
of Baruch Spinoza and translates his “multitudo” as “mass.” Hardt and Negri, however, translate 
the Spinozist term into its English cognate, “multitude.” Because Balibar’s own use of “mass” is 
drawn from Spinoza’s “multitude,” this alteration of terminology should not pose a 
methodological problem. 
124 See Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “plane of immanence.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, “The Plane of Immanence,” in What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 35-60. 
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subordination of society to sociality; the social is a ground of emergence for 
societies. 
     The pattern of regularity–or principle of “self-movement,” to use a more 
Marxist phrase–of a society is determined by apparatuses and networks of control 
that are political, economic, and biopolitical. This principle of self-movement of 
“society” reveals that it is not a static thing, but an ordering dynamic that attempts 
to limit the possible multiplication of social power beyond those that it can 
control and convert, in capitalism, into wealth. 
     “Social power” is the life-force of a society and its potential source of 
dissolution. “Social power” is the multiplication of productive forces of sociality 
that is channeled through the mode of cooperation, which incorporates it into the 
pattern of regularity of society. The mode of cooperation is a societally mediated 
productive force; it is the point at which society must remain open to sociality. 
(Were it to close itself off to its exterior, it would stagnate and cease to exist.)  
     In my analysis of Balibar, in section 4, I asserted that Classes are societal 
entities produced by the division of labor and organized according to the mode of 
cooperation. Their identities only make sense within a given societal form, and 
they cease to exist when that societal form enters a revolutionary period of crisis. 
For this reason, classes themselves are not revolutionary entities. They are the 
products of societal territorialization of the multitude, which is an immanent 
aspect of sociality. That is to say that the multitude is the external social force to 
which society must remain open. Moreover, the multitude resists territorialization 
and subsumption carried out by capital. It is in this resistance against 
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classification that the multitude is capable of introducing revolutionized social 
power into society. 
     Revolution, then, is an irruption of societally repressed or regulated forces of 
sociality into society. As Balibar argues:  
This thesis… admits that the emergence of a revolutionary form of 
subjectivity (or identity) is always a partial effect and never a 
specific property of nature, and therefore brings with it no 
guarantees, but obliges us to search for the conditions in a 
conjuncture that can precipitate class struggles into mass 
movements...125  
 
The outcome of the revolution is not determined by any laws or logic; it is the 
contingent outcome of the struggle against classification and against the 
techniques of power that drive it. 
     Because the irruption of revolutionized social power presupposes such 
techniques of societal power it follows that the limit of the revolution is the 
absolute destruction of society as a transhistorical concept and construct. Sociality 
only finds its expression in society. It is either a source of power, incorporated 
into the reproduction of a societal pattern of regularity, or it is a revolutionary 
force that ruptures the pattern of regularity; in either case, there is no immanent 
return to pure sociality. Every territorialization presupposes a deterritorializing 
force of resistance, and the reverse is also true. This is why communist society is 
imagined as a gesellschaft: we must return to an order of things. The goal of the 
proletarian revolution, then, is to establish an order, a society, with borders that 
are not impassible horizons, but zones of indetermination. A communist society 
                                               
125 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, 147. 
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would be one that sets borders into variation so that they may be reconstituted 
according to the movement of sociality–the life of the multitude. 
     Finally, from all that has just been said, I conclude that capitalism is a form of 
society defined by a pattern of regularity that attempts to code all of social life, 
and not just productive labor-time restricted to the mode of production (or the 
sphere of production within the mode of production). Not only is labor-power 
subsumed by capital as a commodity, but all of social life is incorporated into the 
production of capital. Guy Debord dubbed this subsumption of social reality into 
capital the production of the “society of the spectacle,” which “corresponds to the 
historical moment at which the commodity completes its colonization of social 
life… [when] the world we see is the world of the commodity.”126 
 
VII. Iteration–What is Capital (Crisis)? 
     Thus far in this chapter, much attention has been paid to the functioning of 
society and its apparatuses of control, but little has been said about the particular 
character of this relation of domination. As has already been stated, 
territorialization implies deterritorialization in the same way that every relation of 
domination also implies a force of resistance. Therefore, just as the success of the 
revolution is never guaranteed, the subsumption of all of social life into capital is 
never complete; a society must remain open to its social exterior. In this way, 
social reality must overspill societal capture if there is to be a continued process 
of subsumption. This excess of sociality is not a surplus in the sense of surplus-
                                               
126 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone 
Books, 1995), 29. 
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value or surplus-labor; it is in a very real way useless for the self-movement of 
capital except in that it secures its condition of continuation.  
     This excess of social reality, however, is also the condition of revolution and 
societal dissolution. In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write that 
“capitalist crisis is not simply a function of capital’s own dynamics but is caused 
directly by proletarian conflict.”127 The class-struggle itself determines the laws of 
capitalism’s self-movement and it is this other side of the production of a societal 
pattern of regularity that is obscured by the same fetishism that alienates use-
value for exchange-value.128 Fetishism is the original pattern of regularity that 
secures the stability of the value-form of capital by hiding the contingent reality 
upon which its reproduction is based from the proletariat, which is both the real 
source of capital’s value and its object of exploitation.  
     This means that at the same time as the forces of societal reproduction 
constrain the influx of social power, the influx of social power limits the process 
of societal territorialization. “Proletarian struggles constitute–in real ontological 
terms–the motor of capitalist development… The struggles force capital 
continually to reform the relations of production and transform the relations of 
domination.”129 The point here is that the form of capitalist society and, by 
extension, the value-form of capital is not determined by the internal logic of a 
society, but rather by the violent irruption of social power–particularly the power 
                                               
127 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
261. 
128 “Class-struggle” should be understood, in the context of this analysis, as the struggle of the 
ruling class to control and limit the productive social power of the multitude. This fits with Hardt’s 
and Negri’s definition of the proletariat “as a broad category that includes all those whose labor is 
directly or indirectly exploited and subjected to capitalist norms of production and reproduction,” 
and not just the sellers of labor-power (Hardt and Negri, Empire, 52). 
129 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 208. 
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of the multitude that disrupts the mode of cooperation in its effort to resist being 
subsumed by capital.  
     There is no better illustration of this point than the militant labor activism that 
swept across the United States of America in the middle of the Great Depression. 
Despite the fact that unemployment is, as we have seen, systemically built into 
capitalism as a means of controlling workers by threatening them with job 
insecurity (e.g., the possibility of being replaced at any minute by a more willing 
worker), Depression-era workers across the country rose up and seized control of 
the means of production in order to demand higher-wages and better working 
conditions. The majority of these strikes resulted in at least partial victories for the 
workers, and, perhaps most impressively, this phenomena of labor militancy 
emerged without and fought against the representative leadership of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which consistently pressured workers to end the 
strikes.130 The societal logic of capitalism would have thought such an event 
impossible given that the industrial reserve army of the unemployed was 
supposed to guarantee the impossibility or at least the failure of workers’ 
uprisings in such conditions of economic instability. Furthermore, these strikes 
resulted in an intensification of the reduction in the rate of profit, in order to meet 
workers’ demands, which flies in the face of the law of the expansion of capital 
and should be particularly unthinkable in a time when profit rates had already 
plummeted. Finally, these strikes were not directed or controlled by an 
organization that was supposed to represent the interests of the working-class. 
                                               
130 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003), 
395-401. 
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     Contrary to the example we just explored, the commonplace narrative 
concerning the development of improved labor conditions is guided by a liberal 
capitalist logic in which worker conditions improved in direct relation to the 
expansion of societal wealth. In this way, the successes of the workers movements 
have been ideologically transformed into successes of the liberal capitalist system, 
insofar as representative bodies such as the AFL can be considered a part of this 
societal form. This pervasive mode of thought is visible in “democratic-socialist” 
presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’ rhetoric regarding raising the minimum 
wage to $15/hr:  
Despite huge advancements in technology and productivity, 
millions of Americans are working longer hours for lower wages. 
The real median income of male workers is $783 less than it was 
42 years ago; while the real median income of female workers is 
over $1,300 less than it was in 2007. That is unacceptable and that 
has got to change.131 
 
The basic justification for such a proposal is that stagnant workers’ wages have 
not “kept pace” with increasing worker productivity and skyrocketing GDP. This 
argument essentially boils down to an appeal to the bourgeois state to raise the 
minimum wage in order ensure that workers have more spending power. This 
argument fits squarely within the logic of capitalism. The strike wave of 1934, 
however, proves that the developments of capitalism do not exclusively obey an 
internal societal logic, but are pushed by the power of the proletariat. This “power 
of the proletariat imposes limits on capital and not only determines the crisis, but 
also dictates the terms and nature of the transformation. The proletariat actually 
                                               
131 “Issues: Income and Wealth Inequality,” accessed April 27th, 2016, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/income-and-wealth-inequality/ 
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invents the soci[et]al forms that capital will be forced to adopt in the future.”132 
These Depression-era strikes, for instance, not only resulted in local workers’ 
victories at the sites of labor agitation, they also served as a reason for passing the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which guaranteed workers a right to 
unionize.133  
     The societal forms that the proletariat forces capital to invent, however, are not 
restricted to the immediate demands the proletariat puts forth in an antagonistic 
encounter; capital also anticipates future demands of the multitude and attempts to 
restrict them by controlling their conditions of emergence–i.e., their social 
autonomy. In this sense, “[e]very innovation is a revolution which failed - but also 
one which was attempted.”134 It is for this reason that social reality must be 
subsumed by capital to such an extent that its rebellious potential is limited. This 
is precisely the case today when the globalized mode of “production of capital 
converges ever more with the production and reproduction of social life itself; it 
thus becomes ever more difficult to maintain distinctions among productive, 
reproductive, and unproductive labor.”135 Domestic labor, or “caring labor,” has 
long posed a problem to these distinctions in a way that has pointed out a 
                                               
132 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 268. 
133 See Robert F. Wagner, “The National Labor Relations Act,” in The Era of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt 1933-1945: A Brief History with Documents, edit. Richard Polenberg (Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 68-71. With this bill, Senator Wagner attempted to limit the 
revolutionary potential of the labor agitation by securing the working-class institutions that would 
represent them: “The break-down of section 7(a) [of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 
which established a right of workers to unionize,] brings results equally disastrous to industry and 
to labor. Last summer it led to a procession of bloody and costly strikes, which in some cases 
swelled almost to the magnitude of national emergencies… Far from suggesting a change, it [the 
National Labor Relations Act] merely preserves the status quo.”  
134 Antonio Negri, “Interpretation of the Class Situation Today,” in Open Marxism Volume II: 
Theory and Practice, edit. Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopedis (London: 
Pluto Press1992), 80. 
135 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 403. 
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patriarchal tendency in the Marxist tradition that ensures the marginalization, or 
even the dismissal, of the value of what has traditionally been termed “women’s 
work,” regardless of how socially necessary such work is.136 To situate Hardt and 
Negri’s point in a more modern context and illustrate how it is useful beyond 
critiquing the patriarchal tendencies of Marxist theory, let us briefly examine the 
production of capital from social media sites like Facebook. Certainly Facebook 
employs workers to whom it pays a wage based on their labor time, but the real 
source of wealth for Facebook is the multitude of individuals who reproduce their 
lives in virtuality.137 The virtual (re)production of social life generates 
information that Facebook then sells to advertising firms as a means to increasing 
their financial efficacy by targeting individuals whose interests match products 
those firms are advertising.138 Furthermore, not only is demographic information 
sold to advertisers to facilitate targeted marketing, Facebook also produces 
“scientific knowledge” by running sociological/psychological experiments on 
users in order to better understand human social functioning in a way that can also 
be translated into value.139 This information is valorized in a manner similar to 
capital’s valorization of the wage-labor of the industrial worker; in each case, 
wealth is produced socially and appropriated privately (but in the example of 
Facebook, the producers of wealth receive absolutely none of the value of their 
                                               
136 See Heidi Hartman, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: towards a more 
progressive Union,” Capital and Class 12 (1979): 1-33. 
137 On the concept of unpaid labor and the digital economy see Tiziana Terranova, “Free Labor: 
Producing Culture for the Digital Economy,” Social Text 18 (Summer 2000): 33-58. 
138 Justin P. Johnson, “Targeted Advertising and Advertising Avoidance,” The RAND Journal of 
Economics 44 (Spring 2013): 128-144. 
139 E. Alex Jung, “Is it time to quit Facebook?,” AlJazeera America, August 27th, 2014, accessed 
April 11th, 2016, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/facebook-unpaid-
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life-activity). The reproduction of social life itself, then, cannot be termed 
“unproductive labor” since it is a direct source of capital. This subsumption of 
social life by capital not only demonstrates the changing landscape of power-
relations in capitalism, it also multiplies the points of resistance beyond what are 
traditionally recognized as sites of production. 
     The arguments of Hardt and Negri flesh out the definition of social force and 
societal subsumption or territorialization by directly linking it to the struggle of 
the multitude that is exploited and dominated by capitalism. Their analyses reveal 
that there is no simple determinate dialectical logic guiding the development of 
society. Rather, societal innovations represent tactical shifts made by the 
apparatuses of control in limiting the revolutionary potential of the multitude. In 
Marx’s day, this was done through economic control of the productive capability 
of the industrial proletariat. As capitalism developed, however, it subsumed more 
and more of sociality. The significance of this extensive and intensive 
development of societal control is that the space of societal exploitation and 
domination and the scope of social reality are increasingly homologous. This is 
not to say, however, that they are the same. At the same time as each social 
relation is increasingly becoming a relation of exploitation and domination, it is 
also a site of resistance–a point of potentially revolutionary cooperation. This 
understanding of the exploitation of sociality defies traditional Marxist 
understandings of the value form of capital which rely on the sharp distinction 
between a determinate economic base and a larger societal superstructure. The 
fact that these forms of exploitation are nonetheless real demands that Marxism 
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adapt and incorporate other modes of analysis in order for it to be a 
comprehensive critical theory opposed to all forms of unjust power relations. In 
order to be able to adapt to the diffusion of capitalist exploitation into all of 
sociality, Marxism must recognize that classes defined with reference to an 
autonomous economic base do not exist and that the real revolutionary force is the 
diversity of the multitude that escapes classification. 
VIII. The New Proletariat 
     Because the revolutionary social force is not a class, but rather the social mass 
that precedes classification, Marxism must attempt to expand the scope of its 
political efforts beyond the narrow conception of the economic-struggle. It is no 
longer even fair to say that the economic-struggle needs to be made into a 
political struggle, since increasingly all of social reality is subsumed under 
capital. Thus, I would argue that, rather than recognizing an economic class as the 
political agent of revolution, Marxism must understand the real revolutionary 
power not in the political representation of an economic agent, but in the power of 
social constitution that transgresses and subverts dominant societal relations. 
Because capital’s extensive and intensive subsumption of social reality extends 
far beyond a definite sphere of economic activity, anticapitalist struggle cannot be 
restricted to classes so long as they are conceived of as exclusively economic 
entities. The productive power of the multitude must not be restricted by societal 
territorializations that attempt to divide it and restrict it. This means that the 
boundaries of the revolutionary mass can never be fixed in any final sense. The 
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revolutionary mass cannot be directed from commanding heights; it must be 
produced through constitutive social action. 
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6. Conclusion 
And Implications for Further Research 
 
 
     The preceding two chapters have made the case that there is no already-
constituted class identity located in an autonomous sphere of economic reality. 
The theory of the social whole that is divided between a determinate economic 
base and a societal superstructure is not consistent with Marx’s own economic 
theory, which ascribes so much importance to fetishism in securing the conditions 
of possibility for the functioning of the economic base. The last chapter attempted 
to construct a different social theory from Marxism by analyzing a discursive 
distinction present in the writings of Marx and Engels between society and 
sociality. The discovery of sociality amounts to a discovery of an outside to the 
“social whole” described by Althusser. It reveals that there is not a closed system 
of capitalism; capitalism is rather a dynamic societal form securing its pattern of 
regularity by subsuming social power that is constituted in a space outside of 
societal control. This social force is both the source of wealth for society and a 
source of revolutionary power for the social forces that resist subsumption. To 
summarize this distinction between sociality and society, I would say that the 
societal pattern of regularity is produced through the construction of transcendent 
apparatuses of control; these apparatuses manage and exploit sociality, 
territorializing social forces immanent in social reality by giving them a 
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representative form in order to alienate their actual constitutive power that poses a 
threat to the established societal order.  
     The development of a new social theory was made necessary by the fact that 
the ontological rootedness of class had been destroyed in the dissolution of the 
rigid division between an economic base and a societal superstructure that 
functioned as the model for understanding social reality in traditional Marxism. 
We saw, in chapter 3, how the various concepts of class that appear in Marx and 
Engels were fixed to a plane of consistency that was the economic sphere. If class 
relations can be understood and defined exclusively with recourse to the 
economic mode of production, then we could understand the specific intentions 
and goals of every class simply by studying the conditions of economic reality. 
But when social forces that are irreducible to an economic base determine the 
character of society, then the nature of class-identity becomes a much more 
complex and troubling question. When the social reality is not hierarchized 
between an economic base and societal superstructure, but instead all relations 
exist in a more complex web in which apparatuses of control attempt to exploit 
and dominate nearly every social relation, then the issue of class-identity is not 
simply one of the development of class-consciousness at the political level of 
reality; rather the question becomes one of class-constitution–the very being of a 
class is secured through complex processes of association and production that are 
not exclusively economic.  
     This is not to say that economic stratification does not exist or that classes are 
false productions of 19th century economic theory. Clearly there are differentiated 
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levels of wealth and productivity for given populations. Clearly there are 
exploitative systemic trends that oppress the poor and benefit the rich. But, what I 
would say with regard to economic stratification is that this phenomenon alone 
does not produce revolutionary subjects; economic stratification is intertwined 
with networks of exploitative and dominative societal power relations that are 
irreducible to economic activity. For this reason, “classes” cannot be the exclusive 
subjects of political struggle, at least not as they have been represented in Marxist 
theory. This necessity to understand the proletariat beyond traditional 
classification is compounded by the fact that “labor” no longer refers to the same 
practices as it did in the 19th and early 20th century; when the space of capitalist 
exploitation is increasingly homologous with sociality itself, it becomes difficult 
to ascribe to the exploited masses one class identity. The extensive and intensive 
subsumption of sociality by capitalism forces us to recognize that the value-form 
of capital itself has changed; surplus labor can no longer be measured in labor-
time when exploitation is not limited to a specific site and schedule.  But this does 
not mean that labor has ceased to be the root of value. I agree with Negri when he 
argues that 
the immeasurability of the figures of value does not deny the fact 
that labour is at the basis of any constitution of society. In fact, it is 
not possible to imagine (let alone describe) production, wealth and 
civilisation if they cannot be traced back to an accumulation of 
labour. That this accumulation has no measure, nor (perhaps) 
rationality, does not diminish the fact that its content, its 
foundation, its functioning is labour.140  
 
The omnipresence of labor’s valorization reveals that the distinction between 
public and private is utterly false and allows the proletariat–that great mass that 
                                               
140 Negri, “Interpretation of the Class Situation Today,” 73. 
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resists classification and exploitation–to struggle to secure economic rights of life, 
such as a universal basic income. This demand is only one of a series of steps 
toward a post-capitalist system that does not build itself off of false notions of 
class-interest, but rather is developed from the material conditions of the present.  
     The argument of this thesis amounts to a rebellion against theories of 
representative revolution–i.e., political practices and theories that presuppose that 
the agential mass of the revolution can be entirely directed and plotted anterior to 
the actual constitutive practice of the revolution. The vanguard party cannot hope 
to lead a true proletarian revolution if it seeks to establish a new transcendent 
societal order built on the presupposition of the legitimacy of its theory of class 
rooted in economic relations. Political theories of this kind fail to recognize 
classes as movements (conditioned by resistance and domination) that are always 
in the process of becoming. They are not ultimately determined by economic 
laws, but by living and breathing beings and the relations into which they enter. 
The totality of these social relations, beyond those that are immediately tied up in 
economics, must therefore be recognized as “productive.” This new theory of 
mass movement over class-identity is then a radical expansion of the horizons of 
materialism that follows the spirit of Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” in which he 
wrote that “[t]he chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism… is that the 
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived of only in the form of the object or of 
contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.”141  
In this case, my demand is that all of social movement be considered the material 
basis for a revolutionary project, and not just those social movements that have 
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been traditionally classified as “economic.” Given the distinction derived between 
societal and natural, this would include the forces of nature that are subsumed by 
capitalism and that we, ourselves, are. 
     Despite the fact that the new image of the “social whole” presented here is 
preferable to the base/superstructure division insofar as the former is not logically 
incompatible with Marx’s theory of exploitation, this new topography does 
contain a number of other issues. For instance, it raises a question about the nature 
of capital and the transcendent apparatuses that territorialize social life: if these 
societal forces exert power on sociality, then where do these societal forces come 
from? This is a reformulation of the question posed in chapter 4–namely, “what is 
capital?” In order to be consistent with the idea that sociality is the ground of 
emergence for society, I must assert that capital is a specific coordination of social 
forces, and not an essentially anti-social force that is imposed on social reality 
without first emerging from it. Capital is, then, a specific form of social reality; it 
is a coordination of social activity built on the exploitation of other aspects of 
social reality. The aspect of social reality that is primarily by capitalism is the 
productive potential of the proletariat, conceived of as a multitude and made into 
a class only at the moment of exploitation.  
     As we saw in chapter 5, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels envision 
the character of social reality in communism as a society, and not as immediate 
sociality, while they also assert that in this societal form, people will be free to 
engage in a multiplicity of social activities.142 This continuity of the formation of 
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gesellschaft, society, maintains the critically important position of sociality 
outside of society–that is, sociality remains an exterior to which society must 
always be open. This could imply that social power can only exist when it is 
channeled through specific societal structures. The goal of revolution, therefore, is 
not to stop producing normative societal relations, but instead to ensure that these 
relations are as free from domination and exploitation as possible. Revolution is, 
then, the irruption of transformative social movements that redefine the societal 
pattern of regularity. This would mean that all bodies that regulate social reality 
would need to be recognized as social products themselves. The immanent 
sociality of every institution reveals that societal structures are temporary and 
mutable patterns of a larger social movement. This means that the goal of 
revolution is not destruction but redirection of the macro-social movement that is 
the societal form.  
     The revolution of sociality against society is eternal and its subject is always 
being reconstituted. This raises a second imposing question about the 
social/societal distinction: what does this allow us to say about our revolutionary 
subject? The proletariat, which is now conceived of as a multitude or a mass and 
not as a class, becomes difficult to understand when its interests and revolutionary 
program cannot be localized in one antagonistic source understood as the late 
capitalist economy. But this is not a weakness when we realize that there is a 
plurality of modes of production intersecting in global capitalism today:  
There does not need to be an orderly historical progression of these 
[economic] forms, but rather they must mix and coexist… Various 
regions will evolve to have peasant elements mixed with partial 
industrialization and partial informatization. The economic stages 
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are thus all present at once, merged into a hybrid, composite 
economy that varies not in kind but in degree across the globe.143 
 
If we recognize the existence of global capitalism that incorporates various mixed 
regional and local economic stages, then we must recognize exploited populations 
in industries and regions that escape the economic theory Marx developed in 
response to the functioning of capitalism in 19th century Western Europe. Being 
exploited by global capitalism, these masses would have to be recognized as 
proletarians and not simply be dismissed from that revolutionary movement on 
the grounds that they cannot be conscious of capitalist exploitation and the power 
of the exploited. Global capitalism is reproduced in fundamentally different forms 
in different regions; the proletariat will necessarily be determined by and 
determine these relations and must itself be unique to each historical reality.  
     There is, therefore, no logic or theory that can represent the multitude of the 
proletariat, since its identity is not limited to class-interests produced in one 
specific form of the capitalist mode of production. Instead, there are a series of 
societal forces of control that attempt to territorialize the multitude in various 
ways that will subdue or repress its revolutionary force: these are not restricted to 
economic reality, but must necessarily be societal before being economic or 
political. The societal itself must be an interiority of a territory carved from the 
smooth space of sociality. This smooth space is the social reality that precedes the 
process of territorialization, and the sub-processes of domination and exploitation, 
from which the pattern of regularity for societies develop.144 Revolutionary forces 
                                               
143 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 288-289. 
144 This smooth space is a limit of deterritorialization. It is the space of liberation and its 
realization is the goal of the proletarian revolution. 
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that emerge from this smooth space, therefore, cannot be submitted to 
representative dialectical logic.  
     It may be worth pondering whether this theory leaves room for the 
development of a political logic capable of representing the functioning of 
societal structures apart from the masses they manage and territorialize. That is, 
when a structure, such as the state, successfully reproduces a societal order 
according to capitalist logic, can a dialectical contradiction immanent in the 
functioning of societal structures bring about a moment of crisis that makes the 
revolutionary action of the proletariat possible? Let me return to the example of 
the onset of the Great Depression. This crisis immediately followed a decade of 
unprecedented opulence and societal stability.145 The Depression was not brought 
on by a revolutionary mass movement, but by the incoherent logic of laissez faire 
capitalism.146 This presents us with the idea that societal apparatuses develop 
according to a dialectical logic when they have minimized the influence of social 
forces, which operate according to fundamentally different principles. This 
restriction of dialectical logic to the domain of societal apparatuses would, 
however, only be useful for understanding how instability is a natural way in 
which society must remain open to sociality. Social forces would be different in 
kind from societal apparatuses; the latter may move dialectically, but the former is 
not set on a determined path. It moves a milieu or an assemblage; it is developed 
through unexpected conjunctions of forces that multiply the revolutionary and 
                                               
145 See David J. Goldberg, “Capital Triumphant: The Postwar Decline of the American Labor 
Movement,” in Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 66-88. 
146 Goldberg, Discontented America, 177-183 
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productive potential of masses in ways that dialectical logic, built around 
negation, is incapable of representing. 
     Many Marxists may want to reject the impossibility of establishing a complete 
and closed logical system through which we could understand the interests of the 
proletariat. Those who resist this impossibility should remember that my proposal 
is not a dismissal of revolution or of the proletariat as the agent of revolution. 
Instead, I am arguing that the proletarian revolution simply cannot be directed by 
a representative body. Such a vanguard party would attempt to educate the 
proletariat through the party’s representative image. The result would be that “the 
People always support the Party because any member of the People who opposes 
Party rule automatically excludes himself from the People.”147 If the class is 
understood as a unity capable of being represented in a party, then opponents of 
that party would necessarily be opponents of the class. Thusly all Stalinist purges 
and the entire gulag apparatus would be justified as defenses of the true interest of 
the proletariat.  
     Understanding the class as a product of economic apparatuses of control that 
are imposed on the multitude may make it harder to theoretically pinpoint and 
direct class-interests, but it also allows us to save Marxism from the 
authoritarianism of the vanguard party. This conception of the proletariat as 
multitude thus allows us to revitalize the radical democratic impulse at the heart 
of the Marxist project. This more fluid understanding of a revolutionary body and 
a corresponding tactical logic of revolution, which is incapable of being 
represented, multiplies the possible forms of resistance to societal power from 
                                               
147 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 165. 
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which capital derives its specificity. It demands that the proletarian struggle be 
carried out in all of social life. The resistance of the proletariat must be produced 
locally at the same time as it is globally communicable through a play of 
differences. To attempt to categorize the various forms of resistance that these 
different social struggles would develop is far too large a task for this thesis. My 
goal has been to return to Marx in order to rethink the nature and revolutionary 
potential of classes in a way that would revitalize the democratic spirit of 
Marxism.  
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Reading List 
• The Brothers Karamazov–Fyodor Dostoevsky. I began reading the Brothers late 
in the fall of my sophomore year and finally set the book down just before the 
spring of my junior year. I was introduced to this text by my good friend Kjell 
Nordstrom, who studied Ivan’s tale about the Grand Inquisitor with Nico Jenkins 
in his “Existentialism and Literature” course. The few passages Kjell read to me 
grabbed my attention immediately. I was captivated by the image of a silent 
Christ being condemned to death by the church and of the idea of humanity’s 
psycho-social need to find the divine (or at least an order to the universe) even if 
that requires its invention. However, I did not begin to read the book when Kjell 
brought it to my attention for two reasons: 1) It was big and scary and 2) I did not 
want Kjell to see that I was doing something he recommended. Our friendship is 
defined by a spirit of playful stubbornness that is analogous to the relationship I 
have with my youngest brother. My love of this book is inextricably linked to my 
fond friendship with Kjell.  
     Early in Dostoevsky’s novel, there is a chapter titled “A Lady of Little Faith” 
that has remained with me as it serves as a warning to those too entrenched in 
theory. After hearing the confession of faithlessness from Madame Khokhlakov, 
the Elder Zosima recounts a similar confession given to him by a doctor. This 
doctor presents the paradox of his love for humanity by stating that in his dreams 
he often went “so far as to think passionately of serving mankind,” while in his 
life he begins to detest people when he has to deal with them in the flesh. Zosima 
characterizes these two loves of humanity as love in dreams and active love.  
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     According to Zosima, fetishizing love in dreams is a particularly thorny issue: 
while admiring Madame Khokhlakov’s understanding of love, he states that she 
has not properly started to solve the problem if the motivation for her confession 
of not loving her neighbor was her desire to be praised by the Elder and not a 
desire to actually love her neighbor. At this, she recognizes her vanity rather than 
a desire to love flesh and blood human beings as her true motivation. Zosima then 
states that the first thing she must do in order to grapple with the problem is to 
examine her narratives and motives–to avoid and examine her lies in order to 
reveal the truth that they mask. At the same time, he emphasizes her need to act as 
she contemplates–to practice active love even before escaping her dreams of love.  
     The doctor in the story has an intimate yet abstract understanding of the 
movements of flesh and blood as well as an intimate love of abstract humanity. 
It’s the in-between that he detests–the material reality in-between the conceptual 
micro and macro realities. We must remember that the roots of our abstractions 
are founded in the material world. We must recognize antagonism in the relation 
between our thoughts and our actions, but without being paralyzed by strong 
feelings of guilt or shame. These reactions can entrench us in our dreams, 
throwing us into an introspective spiral that attempts to conceptually understand 
the discontinuity between thought and action without practically changing 
ourselves. The antagonism needs to be looked at not as a break or a gap between 
thought and action existing within us as individuals, but as an actually existing 
social relation cloaked in negativity and individualism. The social lie, the fantasy, 
manifests individually, but must be separated from the individual conscience and 
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examined as a real product of social relations, and at the same time we must act 
before we have a definitive answer to the question of the meaning of the social 
fantasy. Motivations must be examined not as our own, but as products of an 
ensemble of social relations. This is the only way to understand and deconstruct 
the apparent contradiction in the maxim to avoid and examine our lies.  
 
• The German Ideology and “Theses on Feuerbach”–Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels. I was introduced to The German Ideology in my second semester at 
UMaine via Michael Howard’s “Social and Political Philosophy” course. Most of 
the course to that point had focused on the works of social contract theorists–
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. While I enjoyed the arguments of these thinkers, I 
was unfulfilled by the way that they each built their theoretical systems on the 
presupposition of some ahistorical state of nature in which individual humans 
existed outside of political and social formations. My discomfort with the abstract 
primordial foundations of liberal political thought primed me to fall in love with 
Marx’s critical method, which so forcefully takes historical irresponsibility to task 
in The German Ideology. With his own conception of materialist history, Marx 
wants to examine our abstract lies against an objective empirical truth located in 
the material relations of economic activity 
     Though it is primarily a work concerned with the legitimacy of historical 
narratives, The German Ideology is also a fascinating doorway into potential 
theories of language and consciousness. I have returned to this text nearly every 
semester to dive into ideas like the labor as life-activity, language as a material 
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force (with powers beyond communication), the birth of consciousness, and the 
base/superstructure dichotomy. These possible readings of The German Ideology 
fascinate me because they save Marx from being an exclusively economic or 
political thinker. The discussion of these themes within The German Ideology 
reveals how one can move from history and politics to epistemology and 
metaphysics, and vice versa. This writing of young Marx traverses traditional 
disciplinary boundaries of theory, revealing the smooth space of thought and 
rebelling against the disciplined division of mental labor.  
     These deeper readings of The German Ideology were opened to me by the 
three pages of the Marx-Engels Reader that precede The German Ideology, which 
are dedicated to the “Theses on Feuerbach.” Comprised of 11 relatively 
discontinuous paragraphs, this work is a series of critical notes on German 
materialism that asserts the need to include movement, including human agency 
or freedom, within the scope of materialism. The Theses problematize the 
relationship between thought and action, between life and consciousness, in ways 
that laid the conceptual groundwork for the theory of history presented in The 
German Ideology. In this sense, the two works allow the reader to glimpse the 
movement of Marx’s thought. It would be wrong, however, see these theses 
merely as a preface to The German Ideology; these brief notes open up a series of 
ruptures that multiply possible approaches to understanding human existence.  
     I think it’s worth noting that both The German Ideology and the “Theses on 
Feuerbach” were, ironically, nearly lost to history. Engels discovered the Theses 
over 40 years after they were written while he was digging through some old 
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notebooks that came into his possession after Marx died. He published them as an 
appendix to an essay he wrote in 1888. The German Ideology wasn’t published 
until 1932 by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. By that time, the movement 
of material history had taken a toll on the original manuscript: water damage and 
the gnawing criticism of mice rendered certain passages illegible. Perhaps this 
history of isolation and deterioration opens up an ontological problem for a text 
that proclaims that “language is practical consciousness that exists also for other 
men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me as well.” Thankfully these 
works were saved from nonexistence and have been the most formative of my 
thought of all of the works I have encountered.  
 
• Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison–Michel Foucault. This work was 
one of the forces that inspired a profound shift in my study of philosophy and 
history. Before 2014, I was entrenched in the Marxist tradition. I accepted many 
of the central concepts in Marxism–the theory of alienation, dialectical 
materialism, the division of the economic base and the social superstructure, etc.–
as objective truths. When I encountered a theory that didn’t seem to line up well 
with some Marxist concept I would criticize it as an expression of false-
consciousness. This approach was theoretically justified with recourse to Marx’s 
theory of history, which focused its analysis on material relations of production as 
changing, but nonetheless objective sources of truth. Foucault ruined the certainty 
of this theory for me. I’ve heard the guiding methodological question for 
Foucault’s work formulated as: “if truth has its history, then how can history have 
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its truth?” History cannot have an objective truth outside of the context of the 
economy of power in which it was produced. Once we recognize this, we can also 
recognize histories not as a transcendent narrative about the value and trajectory 
of human civilization, but as a tool we can use to deconstruct the effects of 
problematic power relations.  
     I still see in Foucault’s project the continuation of a vital strategy guiding 
Marx’s theory of materialist history. What Marx is primarily rebelling against in 
the German Ideology is the notion that we are at the end of history, that the 
present and its specific forms of social consciousness are eternal. Political 
economy’s primary justification for capitalism is the argument that it is simply a 
reflection of the essence of human nature. History is useful for Marx as a means 
to demonstrating the fact that human nature has fundamentally changed as its 
economic reality changed. Marx used history to deconstruct concepts of static 
eternal human essence and linked the production of these concepts with an 
economy of material relations.  
     What I see as the central theoretical departure of Foucault’s critical historical 
method from that of Marx is that Foucault also wants to deconstruct our 
motivations for writing histories. It is not enough to deconstruct conceptual static 
unities: we must also explore the way in which our deconstructions or positive 
historical narratives are themselves products of problematic power relations. 
Discipline and Punish can only be a critique of power in general after being a 
critique of humanist history. It is not enough to say that European societies 
stopped torturing and began imprisoning individuals they called criminals out of 
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respect for their humanity. The fact is that this love in dreams–the naïve optimism 
of this narrative–does not match up with the history of penal action that has been 
haunted by recidivism since its inception. In other words, Foucault’s historico-
philosophy does not explain the historical antagonism between ideological dreams 
and actions as a movement of false-consciousness (as Marx does with his 
formulation of the problem of ideology), but instead examines what material 
power-relations are at work in the antagonism beyond economic relations of 
production. Foucault sparked a violent rupture in my thought, opening me up to a 
micropolitical plane that is, in my view, consistent with but critical of Marx’s 
location of the macropolitical Real in the economic sphere of social reality. 
 
• Destiny Disrupted–Tamim Ansary. My godfather came to visit my family’s home 
in New Hampshire during the winter break of my final year at UMaine. He took 
me and my brother to a bookstore for Christmas and it was there that Destiny 
Disrupted caught my eye. As a history major studying in the U.S., I’ve found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to find a work of history focused on a region or epoch 
outside of the Western canon that is not filtered through a lens colored by 
American Exceptionalism or Eurocentrism and, for this reason, the idea of “a 
history of the world through Islamic eyes” that was written by a native Afghan 
peaked my interest. The fact that my neocon godfather was footing the bill 
concretized my decision to pick up this book, as I thought it would be amusing to 
have him furrow his brow as he looked this gift over and set it on the clerk’s 
counter, putting his funds toward what he called “a work of fake history.” 
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     Destiny Disrupted is not a detailed scholarly challenge to our Western world-
historical narratives, but a welcoming and fascinating introduction to the 
historical experience of another world. Ansary argues that this dismissal of Islam 
in “world history” produced in the West is to some extent responsible for the 
“clash of civilizations” we are experiencing today. Treating history as a 
teleological account of the realization of Enlightenment values “renders us 
vulnerable to the supposition that all people are moving in the same direction, 
though some are not quite so far along.” In my reading of this text, it seemed that 
Ansary was trying to exorcise the Hegelian spirit haunting Western approaches to 
history by breaking from the premise that world history is an absolute unity. He 
points out that the qualitatively different event marking the parabolic limit “year 
0” in Islam is not the birth of Christ, the individual savior, but the migration of 
Mohammed from Mecca to Medina “which gave birth to the Muslim 
community”–an already collective identity. If Western “civilization” is the 
embodiment of divine virtue (the imitation of Christ), Muslim “civilization” is the 
growth and life of the actually existing community of believers. Ansary asserts 
that, looking at history through these Islamic eyes,  
[w]e would know that the community had stopped expanding, had 
grown confused, had found itself permeated by a disruptive 
crosscurrent, a competing historical direction. As heirs to the 
Muslim tradition, we would be forced to look for the meaning of 
history in defeat instead of triumph. We would feel conflicted 
between two impulses: changing our notion of “civilized” to align 
with the flow of history or fighting the flow of history to realign it 
with our notion of “civilized.” 
 
Yes, this passage reasserts the master-slave dialectic; but it does not reaffirm it. 
Ansary is asserting that we need to write and read multiple world histories in 
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order to break the cycle of bondage built on recognizing one’s self through the 
violent encounter with the other.  
     To me, Ansary’s work uses history as a tool in the same sense as Marx and 
Foucault used it. He accepts a basic formulation of the “Clash of Civilizations” 
thesis in that he agrees that there are qualitatively different “civilizations.” But 
these distinct “civilizations” are not given to us by nature. These different 
normative understandings of “civilization” have been produced by specific and 
heterogeneous histories. Implicit in Ansary’s writing is a demand that we limit the 
scope of “world history” to the age of globalization (roughly after 1870) in order 
to recognize and confront the various and distinct narratives being played out on 
the new stage of globality.  
     If the truth of “civilization” has its history, then this history can be changed, or 
at least recast, in the historical present. Ansary sets the identities of civilizations 
into variation. He is addressing Western readers with an account of the experience 
of Islamic history. In this space between civilizations, Destiny Disrupted’s project 
does not delimit bound beings but rather recognizes borders to be broken in the 
empathetic movement of becoming-other.  
 
• The Monitor–Titus Andronicus. This New Jersey based indie-punk group released 
their second album in March 2010, during the spring of my junior year of high 
school. The group’s catchy guitar riffs and shredding vocal chords have never 
been far from my ears ever since. This album, which once fueled my adolescent 
angst, became an object of contemplation for me since embarking on my 
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undergraduate education. When I was a sophomore here at UMaine, I even went 
so far as to write an extracurricular essay on the first track of the album, “A More 
Perfect Union.” 
     Named after the USS Monitor, the first ironclad ship commissioned by the 
Union Navy, this band’s second album departs from the airy rage of its 
predecessor and roots itself in the history of the American Civil War. The first 
track of the album begins with an excerpt from Lincoln’s Lyceum Address: “If 
destruction be our lot, we ourselves must be its author and finisher. As a nation of 
free men, we will live forever, or die by suicide.” This forms the opening 
pronouncement of the album and the central problem explored by the next ten 
tracks. This problem is then dragged into the present as the fuzzy humming of 
electric guitars and the band’s reformulation of Bruce Springsteen’s iconic single 
“Born to Run”–“tramps like us, baby we were born to die!”–immediately follows 
the final words Lincoln’s address. In the conjunction of these lines, it is not hard 
to hear the echo of Camus’ declaration in the first sentence of the Myth of 
Sisyphus that “[t]here is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is 
suicide.”  
     The final track, “The Battle of Hampton Roads” is somewhat of a conclusion 
only in that it is the most personal meditation on the struggle against 
meaninglessness. Its namesake is a climactic naval conflict between two ironclad 
ships of the Civil War, the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia. The two ships 
engaged each other in a close-range exchange of cannon fire for four-hours, each 
failing to inflict any terminal damage on the other. The battle ended in a stalemate 
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that redefined naval combat around the globe. The album’s final track uses this 
violent stalemate as a metaphor for the ongoing struggle for authenticity: “I think 
the wrong people got a hold of your brain when it was nothing but a piece of 
putty./So try as you may but you will always be a tourist, little buddy./And half 
the time I open my mouth to speak/it's to repeat something that I've heard on 
tv/and I've destroyed everything that would’ve make me more like Bruce 
Springsteen.” To my ear, these frustrated eruptions coalesce into an inchoate 
critique of the self-centeredness and the lack of consciousness that plague subjects 
of (post-industrial) consumer capitalism. In the end, The Monitor’s critique is 
aimed at the conditions of, what Camus called, “a whole generation intoxicated by 
nihilism, and yet lost in loneliness, with weapons in our hands and a lump in our 
throats.” This strange mix of philosophy, history, and indie-punk may very well 
be partially responsible for the direction my intellectual development took. 
 
• The Shadow of What We Were–Luis Sepúlveda. Mid-way through the fall of 
2014, I found myself wandering the ornate marble halls of Rome’s fascist-
inspired central train station with no one to talk to and nothing to read. I popped 
into the third floor of the station’s bookstore, which I was delighted to find that it 
had been devoted to English language publications. I almost decided then and 
there that the Anglo culture’s hegemonic global presence isn’t such a bad thing 
after all; but then I found The Shadow of What We Were, a short novel about 
communists and anarchists, memory and exile, and laughter after atrocity that was 
brought about through a CIA-sponsored coup. 
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     Set in present day Santiago, Chile, the story opens on an old anarchist who 
declares: “I am the shadow of what we were, and while there is light we will 
exist.” When Nolasco next appears in the story, he is accidentally killed by a 
record player flung in a fit of rage from an apartment window while he was en 
route to a meeting of old revolutionaries. The dark joke of a man who in this story 
planned to die intentionally being killed by contingency is perhaps Sepúlveda’s 
humorous argument for the importance of a Marxist understanding of material 
reality beyond the solipsism of anarchistic revolutionary practice.  
     Through the rest of the novel, the four communists with whom Nolasco was to 
meet contemplate how to accomplish a mission without the Shadow to cast them. 
While the heroes reminisce about their youth, the narrator takes over to discuss 
the stifling atmosphere of repression under the Pinochet regime: 
Life became riddled with black holes. They were everywhere, you 
went into a subway station and never came out, you got into a taxi 
and never reached home, you talked of light and were swallowed 
up by shadows.  
Many friends and acquaintances denied knowing one another, in an 
epidemic of amnesia that was essential for self-preservation… 
Forgetting became a pressing need, everything that had been 
pregnant with the future suddenly became poisoned with the past. 
 
Most of the characters went into exile and carried Santiago with them in their 
memories. By returning to find that that the ones they love no longer exist, that 
the city of their memories no longer exists and perhaps never did, we discover 
that they’ve all in some sense been “disappeared by” the Pinochet regime, along 
with the truth.  
     The Marxists, guided by the specter of the Shadow haunting their memoires of 
resistance, decide to dig up Nolasco’s treasure, which contains a small black 
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book, “a book that contained some well-known names and some quite alarming 
figures.” In the end the revolutionaries–Leninist, Maoist, and Anarchist–enter into 
an alliance to reclaim the truth of the past in order to restore the hope of the 
future.  
     The Shadow of What We Were presents such troubling subject matter in a light 
that is equal parts tragicomic and optimistic. I experienced this text as a literally 
breathtaking work of art that could suddenly pull fits of laughter from moments of 
tight-throated sobbing. In this way Sepúlveda championed the spirit of his friends 
laid out in his lyrical dedication: "To my comrades, male and female/who fell, and 
picked themselves up,/licked their wounds, cultivated their laughter,/preserved 
their gaiety, and carried on regardless." I cannot help hearing in these lines the 
echo of Bobby Sands, the Irish Republican who died on hunger strike and foretold 
that “the laughter of our children will be our revenge.” 
 
• Field Work–Seamus Heaney. Heaney was a Catholic from county Derry, in the 
north of Ireland; my father fits this same description. The beginning of my leave 
of absence from UMaine, a couple of months before I found this book, was spent 
with my family in Derry. My father did not come along for that trip, which 
allowed me the freedom to do some digging into the family history without him 
pulling me off of the subject. Dad rarely talked to me and my brothers about his 
experiences in Ireland after childhood. Those early years of his life were set in a 
world colored by bitter sectarianism and restricted by the systemic oppression of 
Irish Catholics. In 1969, when my father was 18, that history of structured 
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inequality irrupted with the furious violence of masses against the loyalist state. 
The Battle of the Bogside, a four day clash of petrol bombs and gunfire, kept 
police and unionists out of “free Derry,” and brought the British Army in to the 
north, marking the onset of “the Troubles.” 
     The event that every relative recounted from this period occurred on January 
30th, 1972–Bloody Sunday. On that day, the whole Coyle family participated in a 
civil rights march protesting the internment without trial of suspected IRA 
members. Protestors, frustrated by British paratroopers who were erecting 
barricades to block the march, began throwing stones. The soldiers responded 
with gunfire and the crowd dispersed in a panic.  
     In the chaos that ensued, my uncle was beaten and detained by British soldiers 
until after curfew; my aunt, a nurse, threw herself over wounded protestors as she 
attempted to care for them; bullets collided with the low brick wall that sheltered 
my father from the approaching British soldiers. On the other side of that barrier, 
Alexander Nash was shot down as he ran to his teenage son, William, who lay 
wounded in the street and then died of gunshot wounds in front of his father. After 
the ten minute “incident,” thirteen other corpses were recovered from the 
Bogside.  
     Following the massacre, the ranks of the IRA swelled as volunteers flocked to 
Bogside “safe-houses” where they would learn to carry a gun, or to build a bomb 
like the one that would kill a friend of Heaney’s in retaliation for the attack.  
He was blown to bits 
Out drinking in a curfew 
Others obeyed, three nights 
After they shot dead 
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The thirteen men in Derry. 
PARAS THIRTEEN, the walls said, 
BOGSIDE NIL. That Wednesday 
Everybody held 
His breath and trembled. 
 
     Field Work was written when Heaney temporarily fled Belfast, during the four 
years that he lived in county Wicklow, in the southeast of Ireland. It is a deeply 
personal work, reflective of this history in the north through elegies dedicated to 
dead friends and dead family. But my favorite poems in this volume concern the 
material relationship between people and their environment, particularly the sea 
and the bogs of rural Ireland. Remembering the industrial past of the coastal town 
of Carrickfergus, Heaney writes:  
When they said Carrickfergus I could hear 
the frosty echo of saltminers’ picks. 
I imagined it, chambered and glinting, 
a township built of light… 
 
People here used to believe 
that drowned souls lived in the seals. 
At spring tides they might change shape.  
They loved music and swam in for a singer 
 
who might stand at the edge of summer 
in the mouth of a whitewashed turf-shed, 
his shoulder to the jamb, his song 
a rowboat far out in evening. 
 
When I came here first you were always singing, 
a hint of the clip of the pick 
in your winnowing climb and attack. 
Raise it again, man. We still believe what we hear. 
One of my favorite stories that my dad used to tell when I was a child was the 
myth of the Selkie–seals that could become humans. These tales are almost 
always tragic romances; a Selkie and a human will fall in love only to be torn 
apart by the Selkie’s longing for its eternal home, the sea.  
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      As miners, the people of Carrickfergus would dig into the earth for crystals to 
be kept. Now that this relation between the people and the land has ended, they 
are only left with the constant changes of the sea. The people of Heaney’s poem 
have reversed the old Irish myth and become Selkies that long to return to land. 
The singer who stands in the turf-shed, a building that would be stuffed with peat-
bricks, used to be the link between earth and ocean; his labor produced his song, 
which would propel him out to sea to find love. Through these lines, which 
describe how his friend’s singing captured the spirit of the town’s life-activity, 
Heaney expresses the materiality of language: “A hint of the clip of the pick…” 
There is no direct rhyme in this line. There is a repetitive striking of the tongue 
that never quite produces the same sound, just as the saltminers’ picks never 
struck the same stone. Maybe the recognition of this material power of language 
could reawaken productive forces that once seemed to make life whole. 
     My father loves to speak with me about these material and cultural histories of 
Ireland, but he doesn’t sing anymore. In his youth, he was “all-Ireland” for banjo 
and mandolin and played and sang in a number of bands. But his psyche was 
injured in the Troubles as he watched the land he knew violently disappear to the 
point that he felt the need to flee across the Atlantic. Maybe the songs he knew 
are oversaturated with sorrow, or maybe they simply feel as if they have no place 
in this new world. Nearly landlocked in New Hampshire, he will sometimes speak 
to me of his longing to return to his eternal home. I am indebted to Heaney for his 
work, which expresses and develops my own understanding of my father’s life.  
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• 20 Poems of Love and a Song of Despair–Pablo Neruda. I discovered this work of 
poetry in a Spanish class I took during my junior year of high school (2010). I had 
no profound appreciation for poetry before that moment. Since then, hardly a 
week has gone by without some words from Neruda’s verses passing through my 
mind. Over the years, I must have owned at least 15 copies of this book, though I 
don’t think I lost a single one. I made a habit of distributing this text to dear 
friends and loved ones in their times of sorrow and joy. In my own personal 
experience, the poems from this selection have intensified my passion and desire 
in love. (En ti los ríos cantan y mi alma en ellos huye/como tú lo desees y hacia 
donde tú quieras./Márcame mi camino en tu arco de esperanza/y soltaré en 
deliorio mi bandada de flechas.) They’ve also occasionally intensified my sorrow 
at losing love, while also reminding me that the painful (re)discovery of romantic 
solitude is a common human experience; solidarity is to be found in the aftermath 
of having loved in action as well as in dreams. (Ya no la quiero, es cierto, pero 
cuánto la quise./Mi voz buscaba el viento para tocar su oído./... Ya no la quiero, 
es cierto, pero tal vez la quiero./Es tan corto el amor, y es tan largo el olvido.) 
     Beyond their romantic significance, this series of poems functions as a lasting 
connection to my love for the Spanish language. I declared a Spanish major 
during my sophomore year here but quickly became frustrated with the structure 
of the department and left. To some extent, I still regret the decision to departure 
from a language I spent 7 years studying. Works like this one remind me that 
though to a great extent I closed my academic connection to Spanish, it remains 
an interest of mine and a minor part of my identity. I read the poems in the 
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original Spanish and reference the English versions in order to understand what 
limitations are imposed on poetic language in translation and to compare the 
interpreter’s reading of the poem with my own.  
 
• Don Quixote–Miguel de Cervantes. I began reading Don Quixote immediately 
after finishing The Brothers Karamazov and was shocked when I finished it in 
two weeks. I actually had some trouble staying focused on my course load as I 
became obsessed with this fictional history about a man who becomes a knight 
errant after becoming obsessed with fictional histories about knight errants. 
Quixano the Good studied tales of justice and virtue and reinvented himself as 
Don Quixote in order to fight for his literary ideals. His quest for justice, however 
does not take root in the social world of Early Modern Spain. Drawing on this 
example, I began to worry about whether burying myself in books had given me 
any real understanding of the world that could be substituted for experience.  
     Don Quixote was the work that finally threw me into a spiral of dissatisfaction 
with my academic track. After reading this novel, I decided to leave for a 
semester. I saw in Don Quixote a challenge to reinvent myself outside of the text, 
to not let consciousness shape my life in a commanding way, but instead to 
attempt to let life shape my consciousness. Reflecting on my travels now, I am 
aware of how very solipsistic the whole ordeal was–my nose in books, my pen in 
a journal, and my heart closed to travelers who could have been more than just 
acquaintances. This failure seems to mirror a misreading of the subject in Don 
Quixote: I saw Don Quixote as the sole subject of the story without paying much 
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attention to Sancho Panza. Sancho was a problem to me; he is an unreflective 
hedonist who seems to blindly believe in Quixote’s outdated ideological dream. 
What I missed is the real development of the central characters in this novel 
occurs in the development of their friendship as they challenge and accept one 
another. 
  
• Autobiography of Red–Anne Carson. Kirsten Jacobson assigned this novel in 
verse for her “Existentialism and Literature” course, where phrases of Carson’s 
like “There is no person without a world” and “Up against another human being 
one’s own procedures take on definition” paired nicely with Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
Being and Nothingness and Nausea. This performative treatise on how poetic 
language can reimagine and produce life quickly became my favorite text from 
my first semester at UMaine. 
     Autobiography of Red is a modern retelling of an ancient retelling of the 
mythical 10th labor of Herakles–his slaughter of a red monster named Geryon and 
theft of his red cattle. The ancient retelling of the tale was done by Stesichoros, 
the post-Homeric lyric poet. Fragments are all that remain of Stesichoros’ poem 
Geryoneis, in which he imagined and invented the life of Geryon from childhood 
to his death in a way that treats Geryon as a full being, deserving of our sympathy 
for suffering brutality at the hands of a less than heroic Herakles. Carson includes 
16 creatively translated fragments of the original Stesichoros poem as a preface to 
her own reinvention of the tale: 
XII. WINGS 
Steps off a scraped March sky and sinks  
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Up into the blind Atlantic morning One small 
Red dog jumping across the beach miles below 
Like a freed shadow 
 
XIII. HERAKLES’ KILLING CLUB 
Little red dog did not see it he felt it All 
Events carry but one 
 
XIV. HERAKLES’ ARROW 
Arrow means kill It parted Geryon’s skull like a comb Made 
The boy neck lean At odd slow angle sideways as when a 
Poppy shames itself in a whip of nude breeze 
 
XV. TOTAL THINGS KNOWN ABOUT GERYON 
He loved lightning He lived on an island His mother was a  
Nymph of a river that ran to the sea His father was a gold 
Cutting tool Old scholia say that Stesichoros says that 
Geryon had six hands and six feet and wings He was red and 
His strange red cattle excited envy Herakles came and  
Killed him for his cattle 
 
The dog too 
 
XVI. GERYON’S END 
The red world And corresponding red breezes 
Went on Geryon did not 
 
     Carson opens this text on the question “what difference did Stesichoros 
make?,” which is really a larger question about what difference poetic language 
can make. Her answer to this first question locates Stesichoros’ importance in his 
inventive use of adjectives: “These small imported mechanisms are in charge of 
attaching everything in the world to its place in particularity. They are the latches 
of being… Stesichoros released being. All the substances of the world went 
floating up. Suddenly there was nothing to interfere with horses being hollow 
hooved… Or an insomniac outside the joy.” In the poetic language of the Greek 
epic-oral tradition, adjectives are structurally fixed reminders that maintain the 
stability of the word and the world. Homer’s Athena is always “grey-eyed Pallas 
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Athena” and his dawn’s fingers are always “rose-red.” Stesichoros, Carson 
argues, saw beyond the world coded by the epic word to find other possible 
substances, other possible worlds, and brought them into existence through new 
codings. 
     Geryon’s life was one of these possible worlds and was rescued by Stesichoros 
when he took an empathetic look at the underside of Greek “civilization’s” 
conquest of monstrosity. By making Geryon into a being valid of poetic 
consideration, Stesichoros expanded the horizons of meaning. After delivering 
this message in the first 10 pages of her work, Carson sets out to do a very similar 
action by bringing Geryon to life in modern America where readers see his 
newly-envisioned life as a troubled and anxious person unfold from grade school 
to adulthood in 47 poems. 
     In the seventh poem, Carson fleshes out the movement between Stesichoros’ 
15th and 16th fragments. She has Geryon write the “total facts known about 
Geryon” himself as a part of an autobiography project in elementary school. It 
ends on a note similar to Stesichoros’ fragment: “Geryon had a little red dog 
Herakles killed that too.” During Parent-Teacher Day, Geryon’s mother asks if 
Geryon ever writes anything with a happy ending. Hearing this, Geryon takes the 
autobiography from his teacher’s hand and writes: “New Ending./All over the 
world the beautiful red breezes went on blowing hand/in hand.” By including the 
two fragments in one poem, and by crediting Geryon as their author, Carson 
reinvents the passage between them. No longer are they pronouncements from an 
authoritative voice giving an objective account of the truth of the world. Now the 
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two are the emotionally charged self-judgements of a sad little boy who writes a 
new ending, which ultimately does not change the preceding events in the story, 
to comfort his mother. In this passage, Carson opens up a new understanding of 
Stesichoros as an author by questioning his motivation for writing fragment 16. 
She also makes the modern reader see and feel the long-suffering life of Geryon–a 
red winged monster of a boy outside of the normative bounds of masculinity and 
sexuality. The other 46 poems in Autobiography of Red similarly invent and 
unearth new possibilities of life for the reader and for its subject matter. Carson’s 
writing and thinking stayed with me as evidence of the validity of a discursive 
reality that ought to be considered a part of material reality. 
 
• A Thousand Plateaus–Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. If Miguel de Cervantes 
provided the affective inspiration for my break from UMaine, Deleuze and 
Guattari made me realize its necessity conceptually. With A Thousand Plateaus, 
these two thinkers set out to unearth and celebrate a different mode of thinking. In 
the translator’s introduction to the work, Brian Massumi argues that this mode of 
thinking is not directed toward the consolidation of ever more knowledge, but is 
guided by a desire to open new possibilities of life. “The question is not: is it true? 
But: does it work? What new thoughts does it make possible to think? What new 
emotions does it make possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions 
does it open in the body?” Massumi admits that this presentation of thought may 
have no effect on many readers who are happy with the tradition of “arborescent” 
philosophy–philosophy that first lists its premises and follows the argument 
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linearly through to its conclusion. There is nothing inherently wrong with thought 
that traces the movement from root to trunk to branches, but Deleuze and Guattari 
want to demonstrate that this is not the only life of the concept. Their 
demonstration deeply affected me and I found that every “free moment” I had was 
spent contemplating their writing.  
     These thinkers draw on the structure of the rhizome to form a new image of 
thought. Rhizomes are subterranean stem-structures of plants which sprout roots 
laterally (perpendicular to the force of gravity). They are made of nodal points 
connected by lines spanning “nondecomposable variable distances” (distances 
that cannot be divided without the points and the whole changing in nature). 
Rhizomes are never fully-closed interiorities, “any point of a rhizome can be 
connected to anything other, and must be.” The rhizome develops and lives by 
entering into assemblages with other unities that are multiple in themselves–
multiplicities. Building on this image of thought, Deleuze and Guattari seek a new 
geography for thought in the smooth-space of the steppe rather than the striations 
and static unities comprising the forest. They structure this text according to that 
rhizome-structure for which they advocate: it is composed of 15 “plateaus” which 
can be read in any order and that constantly make reference (draw lines of flight) 
to each other. Their writing covers linguistics, zoology, history, military science, 
political theory, quilting, psychoanalysis, geology, botany, music, painting, 
literature, mathematics, architecture and a hoard of other subjects as they 
deterritorialize the boundaries that separate them in an attempt to reconstitute the 
smooth space of thought.  
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     After reading this book for a semester, I began to go stir-crazy. How much had 
I allowed myself to grow and change in my time as an undergrad? Had I simply 
been following a ready-made path of social mobility and expectation? In high 
school, I was a mediocre student at best. What drove me to attend college? It was 
the next logical step in the preservation of my life as a member of the “middle 
class.” Why did I move to Maine? No one from my social milieu in New 
Hampshire would be there. But a jump from central New Hampshire to central 
Maine is hardly any change at all–from college town to college town surrounded 
by different trees in the same forest. What had I planned for a future? 7 more 
years of schooling. It seemed like I was standing on a ready-made academic 
escalator and minimally working to define myself. In my waking dreams, I’d 
often go so far as to think passionately about leaving for another life: rolling hills 
of Irish grass and the hard dusty surface of the Spanish desert beckoned to me. 
But after reading D+G I wanted to move further outside of my familiar territory 
and travel new roads cherishing encounters with strangers for the brief but 
significant events that they were.  
     Deleuze and Guattari challenged me to pursue nomadic thought by taking to 
the road. I don’t know if I could call my trip a success. I don’t know that I took 
the risks necessary to say that I strayed too far from that path. But I rested my 
head and discovered that there was indeed an outside to the academy. I realized 
that I wanted to write and read even in that outside. To some extent, the question 
as to whether or not in my travels I met their challenge has been left aside as a 
truth I’ll never grasp. What is important is that because of their challenge to 
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rethink change and movement as concepts, I feel more complete as a being by 
continually trying to be open to anything other–to rupture my self. As they state, 
the goal of becoming-… is to “reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but 
the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no 
longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, 
multiplied.” 
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